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coordinating economic development organizations within a community.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Social Coordination and Networks

In his second discourse, On the Origin of Inequality, Jean-Jacques Rousseau
(1754/1987) presents the following argument:
Taught by experience that the love of well-being is the sole motive of human
actions, he found himself in a position to distinguish the rare occasions when
common interest should make him count on the assistance of his fellowmen, and
those even rarer occasions when competition ought to make him distrust them. In
the first case, he united with them in a herd, or at most in some sort of free
association, that obligated no one and that lasted only as long as the passing need
that formed it. In the second case, everyone sought to obtain his own advantage,
either by overt force, if he believed he could, or by cleverness and cunning, if he
felt himself to be the weaker.
This is how men could imperceptibly acquire some crude idea of mutual
commitments and of the advantages to be had in fulfilling them, but only insofar
as present and perceptible interests could require it, since foresight meant nothing
to them and far from concerning themselves about a distant future, they did not
even give a thought to the next day. Were it a matter of catching a deer, everyone
was quite aware that he must faithfully keep to his post in order to achieve this
purpose; but if a hare happened to pass within reach of one of them, no doubt he
would have pursued it without giving it a second thought, and, having obtained
his prey, he cared very little about causing his companions to miss theirs. (pp. 6162)
Rousseau’s argument is based on his conjectures regarding the behavior of human
beings in the state of nature and the basis for establishing civilization. One might well
disagree with his characterization of such humans as solitary individuals with limited
societal connections. The story of the deer hunt, however, illustrates a challenge that
certainly can be found in modern society: the means by which coordination is realized in
order to achieve greater benefits for all participants in an activity.
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Robert Putnam (1993), in his seminal study of democracy in modern Italy,
identified this same challenge and found two different responses. In the north of Italy,
there was a tradition of cooperation that persisted over a long period of time and to which
could be attributed significant economic advancement as individuals relied upon social
institutions that fostered arrangements that would provide mutual benefit. In the south of
Italy, on the other hand, no such tradition existed and, in fact, a history of suspicion of
one’s neighbors tended to make the exercise of social capital the more difficult. As a
consequence, the south tended to be less well off than the north economically.
Modern humans’ social coordination follows three pure types. The market
provides for coordination in accordance with Adam Smith’s invisible hand when large
numbers of individuals or organizations rationally pursue their own self-interest.
Hierarchy provides for organization with higher levels exerting authority over those in
lower levels of the organizational structure, and is well suited to organizing for joint
action when market mechanisms might not be appropriate. Both these forms of
coordination have been extensively studied.
Between these two types is found the third: networks. As a pure type, networks
are distinguished from markets by the relatively few participant individuals or
organizations that seek to coordinate their relations. They are distinguished from
hierarchies by the absence of recognized authority exercised by one network participant
over another.
A distinction may also be made among these three forms of social coordination
based on the nature of the personal interactions that take place within them. Network
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interactions involve collaboration. Those of hierarchies are based on control. Markets are
characterized by competition.
Networks can be found within and among the private, public, and nonprofit
sectors of the economy. They can exist among individuals or organizations. They can be
vertical in nature connecting, for example, a federal bureau, a state agency, and a local
government department. In such a setting, one might well find that coordination can be
characterized by principal-agent relationships along with their attendant problems, such
as shirking and the need for monitoring (Kettl, 1993).
Networks can also be characterized as horizontal, connecting agencies across
several departments, fostering coordination among private sector producers of similar
products, or providing for communication among all the human service providers within
a given community. Horizontal networks involved in policy implementation at the
community level are the subject of the research reported in this paper.
As will be indicated below, there are many aspects to social coordination through
networks that are of interest to public administration researchers. Defining the nature of
network relationships, evaluating the success of policy implementation through networks,
and considering the implications for democracy of the increased use of networks for
service delivery are all worthwhile topics. That networks exist for policy implementation
in the public sector gives rise to a fundamental question: How do community actors
decide to participate in interorganizational networks for the purpose of policy
implementation? Answering this and related questions is the purpose of the proposed
research.
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As Rousseau (1754/1987) and Putnam (1993) both indicate, coordination among
interested parties is not automatic. Despite benefits that can be identified in cooperation,
individuals choose to pursue their self-interest, sometimes sacrificing apparent gain that
would result from joining with others in a coordinated action. Understanding the reasons
why such decisions are made is of value not only in characterizing the nature of
coordination in networks but also in informing network actors so that they might be more
effective in organizing such coordination. This research, then, addresses the interests of
both scholars and practitioners.
It does so by placing the subject of networks within the larger context of
governance. Current discussions regarding governance are concerned with the manner in
which government programs and policies are implemented through alternative means
including networks. While the manner in which decisions are made within public
hierarchies has been the subject of much research, it is less clear that the foundational
decision in interorganizational networks–Shall I cooperate with others?–can be answered
within the same theoretical traditions. As is noted below, a number of researchers cite the
role of trust in the formation and maintenance of networks. It will be argued that an
interdependent, strategic perspective of conflict and cooperation, by addressing the
effects of self-interest and culture, provides a better basis for understanding the
interactive decision-making among real and potential interorganizational network actors.
A model of such decision-making is presented below that was the subject of field
testing in a community setting by case studies involving actors engaged in local
economic development activities. What was of interest was the refining of the model
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based on the case studies so that it would be sufficiently robust as to encompass a wide
range of horizontal interorganizational network interactions.
As is shown in Chapter 2, there is some ambiguity with regard to the meaning of
“networks.” For the purposes of this research, the focus has been on those networks
characterized by regular, repeated patterns of contacts between organizations organized
around the performance of specific tasks. Accordingly, social networks, characterized by
less formal contacts between individuals, are not incorporated into the model.
The significance of this research into decision-making in interorganizational
network settings is in the distinct role that such decision-making plays with regard to the
network itself. As with other forms of social coordination, decision-making—the
choosing among available alternative actions—determines what results from that
coordination. More is achieved, however, from decision-making in networks. Because
decisions in networks are fundamentally decisions to cooperate with other network
actors, the very existence of networks and their capacity to provide for interdependent
action on the part of constituent actors is a function of the decision itself. Understanding
the factors that determine how such decisions are made helps to illustrate the
effectiveness of networks in public policy implementation and the capacity of society to
depend on them for coordinating actions addressing societal needs.

Interdependent Decision-Making Model

A game approach provides the basis for constructing a simplified model of
processes used in interdependent decision-making in interorganizational networks. The
proposed model borrows concepts from the field of game theory, described more fully in
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the next chapter. (A glossary of terms relevant to an understanding of game theory is
found in Appendix A.)
The simplicity of the Prisoners’ Dilemma, Stag Hunt and other one-shot, twoperson games belies the value of using game theory concepts to analyze strategic
interactions among parties. Gates and Hume (1997) note that the utility of game theory
modeling is in the rigor and precision that it brings to the analysis of the subject of
concern. The rigor is obtained through the application of a structured game; the precision
comes from the identification of the relevant actors and the strategies and payoffs
available to them. Kollock (1998), for example, drew on this precision by using game
theory to model social dilemmas, circumstances in which individually rational actions
lead to results that are collectively irrational.
Fewer examples are noted in which decision-making within interorganizational
networks is considered from the perspective of game theory. O’Toole (1997, 2000) cites
only a few in his discussion of the topic. In addition, Putnam (1993) briefly analyzes
aspects of collective action problems in social networks through the use of game theory.
Peters (1998a) notes similarities to repeated games in suggesting an iterative decisionmaking process in organizational coordination: “Everything else being equal I would
expect co-ordination processes to be more effective when each event represents one in a
continuing series of interactions” (p. 305).
The model developed here does not adhere strictly to classical game theory
analysis. Instead, it borrows concepts from game theory that are relevant to decisionmaking in environments in which individuals must consider the actions of others when
making choices. The model sacrifices rigor and precision in favor of a perspective of
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decision-making that accounts for limitations of human rationality. In this respect it is
similar to the approach advocated by Koppenjan and Klijn (2004) for use in the analysis
of network interactions. They suggest that this approach might be thought of as a
qualitative game to distinguish it from classical, or quantitative, game theoretic
approaches.
For Koppenjan and Klijn (2004), networks “are more or less stable patterns of
social relations between mutually dependent actors, which form around policy problems
and/or clusters of means and which are formed, maintained and changed through a series
of games” (pp. 69-70). They are a response to dealing with uncertainties associated with
wicked problems (Rittel & Webber, 1973) when more traditional responses seem
inappropriate or ineffective. These uncertainties are of three types. Substantive
uncertainty stems from the nature of the problem itself. Strategic uncertainty results from
incomplete information about the actions that others involved with the problem are likely
to take. Institutional uncertainty is a function of the variety of backgrounds of the
individuals or organizations concerned with the problem.
The game approach used by Koppenjan and Klijn (2004) focuses on actors,
strategies and arenas. Actors can be individuals, groups, and organizations involved with
the problems. Strategies are “actions or intentions for actions aimed at influencing (the
behaviour of) other parties, the content of problem formulations and/or the solutions
considered, or the development of the problem solving process” (p. 47). Arenas are the
fields or contexts within which interactions take place. Three other elements, described
more fully below, are added to the proposed model: payoffs, focal-point effects, and
culture.
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Economic Development
To be effective in providing a useful perspective on strategic and interactive
processes, the model should clarify how coordination occurs among interdependent
actors. The starting point for the model must be the selection of a subject area for
consideration. This ensures that the model is applicable at least to that subject area. The
ultimate value of the model, however, will be found in the ability to generalize from that
subject area to others of a like nature.
Local economic development provides a field of study that is well-suited to
decision-making model development in an interorganizational network environment.
While having both horizontal and vertical dimensions, it is the former that is of interest in
this analysis in that it is more likely to avoid principal-agent relationships. Economic
development also provides sufficient complexity to meet the test of being a wicked
problem, a condition expected to provide the impetus for network formation.
Agranoff and McGuire (2003) note that “nearly everything a city does is
economic development” (p. 22). A narrower view of the subject is used in this research.
Economic development describes programs, activities, and processes undertaken for the
purpose of improving the economic opportunities available to residents of an area
through the expansion of employment opportunities or the retention of existing jobs
and/or for the purpose of creating an environment that attracts private investment.
Economic development encompasses activities as varied as marketing, development of
industrial sites, recruitment of retail businesses, provision of loans, job training, and so
forth. While such activities are undertaken at various geographic levels, the research uses
as its area of interest those activities occurring at the community level.
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The received wisdom on local economic development suggests that cooperation
on the part of the parties involved in the process should lead to better outcomes for all
community participants. The logic of this assumption reflects the wide range of tasks that
constitute a comprehensive economic development program. Reese and Rosenfeld
(2002), for example, identify nearly 50 economic development techniques employed by
communities. For any single entity to undertake all such tasks could prove to be costly,
particularly for smaller enterprises with more limited resources. It would make sense for
local groups to cooperate in the provision of economic development services, sharing in
the fruits of their coordinated labors while benefiting from reduced cost for each entity.
There is a problem with this rationale, however. The assumption that provides for
the normative appeal of interorganizational provision of economic development services–
that engaging in such activities yields enhanced community economic well-being at a
lower cost for individual participants—is without a solid foundation. Bartik (W. E.
Upjohn Institute, 2002) has concluded that little effort is made to evaluate the success of
economic development programs. Similarly, Schneider (1992) states, “there is evidence
that . . . pro-growth policies have had (at best) only a marginal effect on the location
decisions of firms” (p. 215). Feiock, Jeong, and Kim (2003) write:
Evaluations of economic development programs report some success in attracting
new firms and investment but these efforts often do not substantially improve
employment opportunities in a community. . . . This raises a question: Why do so
many cities aggressively pursue development programs despite their failure to
generate jobs? (p. 618)
It would seem that such programs are undertaken because participants receive
payoffs that reflect other interests in the economic development process. Rubin
(1988/1999) found that economic development practitioners were cynical about the
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benefits of their work as far as its impact on the economies of their communities. As a
reaction to the complexity of their work environment, however, they could define their
work as a response to demands or requests of businesses. He determined that “working to
actualize these requests provides the practitioner with a checklist of activities that
replaces the broad, undefinable task of promoting economic development with a set of
concrete sequential steps” (p. 264) and noted:
Both ego and, perhaps, maintaining their jobs require visible successes. . . .
Accordingly, these practitioners require ways of claiming credit for visible
outcomes. . . . What is implied is that economic development practitioners will
push localities to make concessions so that they can show some progress in their
work. (p. 275)
Rubin and Rubin (1987) have shown that, perhaps from desperation, poorer cities
spend more on economic development programs while receiving few benefits. They
suggest that this results from a “garbage can” model of decision-making in which “the
solution that gets adopted need not be the optimal one, or even a satisficing one, but
rather the one that happens to be available to those making decisions” (p. 56). Offering
incentives, then, is the solution available to these officials. Even though local officials
can do little to influence employment in their cities, providing incentives and publicizing
those decisions has the effect of appearing to take action to address the problem. Rubin
and Rubin conclude that providing these incentives is a symbolic action that, despite its
cost, can have significant political value for these officials. Edelman (1967) described
these symbolic aspects of politics, noting that for most people, politics is a “passing
parade of abstract symbols” (p. 5). The majority participates in the political process
largely as spectators. While elites benefit from politics through the receipt of tangible
benefits, the masses of citizens largely receive symbols. The provision of economic
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development incentives is a symbol, then, through which local officials derive the benefit
of maintaining their positions by demonstrating to the public that government is doing
something to improve local economic conditions.
In their comparison of council-manager and mayor-council governments, Feiock
et al. (2003) found that “income had an inverse relationship with the use of each of the
development strategies in mayor-council cities” (p. 621) and concluded that “councilmanager government constrains administrative officials’ opportunistic behavior by
substituting low-power bureaucratic incentives for high-power electoral incentives” (p.
623). Wolman, Ford, and Hill (1994) have shown that cities that are perceived as
economic development successes do not, in fact, show improvement in the economic
well-being of residents. They hypothesize that high-profile downtown redevelopment
projects create an image of success but no actual benefits to the economy.
Even this somewhat cynical analysis of economic development would seem to
suggest that there are reasons for economic development actors always to cooperate.
Without regard for the results of economic development activities, cooperating to engage
in them should result in lower costs to achieve those results. Evidence suggests that this is
not always the case. Agranoff and McGuire (2003) have developed a typology of cities
and their economic development strategies based on evidence of collaborative activity
and collaborative strategy, but note that not all cities choose to engage in collaboration.
Consider the example of a city government and a nonprofit economic
development organization. The former must approve the granting of tax abatements for a
new industry while the latter is involved in recruiting new industries to the community.
Existing policies and past practice have given the director of the economic development
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organization reason to believe that he can count on the city government to grant an
abatement for the maximum allowable number of years for any industry that is attracted
to the community. In bringing such an industry, however, the city’s community
development director determines that the nature of the business conducted by the industry
is likely to result in a significant demand on the community’s waste water treatment
system and recommends against the granting of the abatement. In this instance, then,
differing concerns have led to conflict that, in effect, has the economic development
organization’s director hunting stag while the community development director decides
to hunt hare.
Even in the absence of such an obvious conflict, it is not automatically given that
parties will cooperate. Due to the cost of undertaking economic development initiatives,
it might well be desirable to indicate a willingness to cooperate while actually pursuing
alternative strategies. For example, it is far cheaper to promise to upgrade the water
system so as to provide higher system pressures to meet commercial customer demands
than to actually do so. Decision-makers might enjoy the rewards of both appearing
cooperative while keeping water rates to existing customers at lower levels.
Game Elements
Actors
For the purposes of the proposed model, actors are individuals, as distinct from
groups or organizations, involved in economic development within the local community.
The positions of these individuals might vary from community to community. Typically,
however, one would expect to find individuals associated with city government such as
the city manager, planning director, community development director, economic
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development director, and downtown development authority director involved. Other
organizations play a role in economic development as well. Chambers of commerce,
community or area-wide economic development nonprofit organizations, regional
planning organizations, and the like can all be expected to have employees dedicated, in
whole or in part, to economic development functions.
Strategies
Koppenjan and Klijn (2004) identify five types of strategies involved in policy
games: go-alone; conflictual; avoidance; cooperative; and facilitating. Since the primary
purpose of the research is not to explore in detail the strategies actors pursue, strategies
that might be considered cooperative or facilitating will be referred to as the former. All
other strategies will be referred to as noncooperative.
Arenas
There are a variety of arenas or contexts within which local economic
development networks might be found. These include downtown development, industrial
development, and retail development which are primarily concerned with job creation,
quality of life and community image and promotion issues. In much the same way that
different communities have different organizations involved in various aspects of
economic development, there is also variety in the arenas within which the activity takes
place. In general, little effort has been made from a model standpoint to distinguish
among these arenas or to show the manner in which they are distinct or overlap.
Infinitely Repeated Game
The games depicted in Figures 2 and 3 in the next chapter are one-shot games.
With regard to the structure of local economic development it seems likely that this game
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is one that is infinitely repeated. That is, the actors can be expected to have repeated
interactions without a foreseeable time in the future when such interactions will
terminate. Such a setting could be expected to favor the development of cooperative
relationships.
The dynamic nature of the infinitely repeated game offers opportunities to
consider the factors that influence decision-making in an interorganizational setting. The
learning that occurs in this setting, then, relates to the acquisition of information
necessary to the process of updating prior information in order to apply Bayes’s Rule. It
is unreasonable to expect, however, that that information is solely a function of the
decisions of the players in particular instances and ignores other information. Players
might well signal their intentions with regard to actions. The reputations of players based
on their behavior in other settings can be expected to influence the assignment of
probabilities. Decision-making style, position tenure, and the like all might have an
impact. Further, as decisions are made, players are better equipped to determine the
payoffs that players realize by their actions.
The Role of Culture
The literature on networks in the field of public administration proposes that a
mechanism that gives rise to the choice to cooperate is trust (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001;
Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998; Mandell, 1999b; Painter, IsaacHenry & Rouse, 1997). It seems reasonable that trust among participants is beneficial to
sustaining ongoing network relationships. It is far less clear how trust could exist at the
beginning of such relationships. Agranoff and McGuire note that the literature also
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highlights the importance of “common purpose, mutual dependency, resource
availability, catalytic actors, and managerial ability” (p. 312).
Provan and Milward (2001) suggest that another factor is the far more significant
determinant: “It is important to recognize that individual agencies and their managers are
still motivated partly by self-interest. For organizations considering becoming part of a
network, the relevant question is, how can network involvement benefit my agency? (p.
420).”
How, then, does the self-interested individual arrive at a decision to join other
self-interested individuals in a cooperative undertaking? Why do some individuals choose
to cooperate while others do not? Game theorists believe that certain elements in the play
of games with multiple equilibria will tend to focus the attention of participants on
particular outcomes. These focal-point effects (Schelling, 1960/1980) include such
factors such as the status quo, pre-play communication and cultural traditions. In games
of multiple equilibria, however, focal-point effects could direct players toward more than
one equilibrium. Myerson (1991) states:
When different factors tend to focus attention on different equilibria, the question
of which equilibrium would be focused on and played by real individuals in a
given situation can be answered only with reference to the psychology of human
perception and the cultural background of the players. From a game theoretic
perspective, cultural norms can be defined to be the rules that a society uses to
determine focal equilibria in game situations. (p. 113)
This conception of the role of focal points unites two competing views of human
motivation. J. Q. Wilson (1993/1997) considers each of these views incomplete: “To
believers in culture, ‘man is social’; to students of self-interest, ‘man is an animal.’ To
me, ‘man is a social animal . . .” (pp. 122-123). E. O. Wilson (1998/1999) takes a
somewhat similar view, seeing a link between genes and culture: “What we inherit are

16
neurobiological traits that cause us to see the world in a particular way and to learn
certain behaviors in preference to other behaviors” (p. 163). Balkin (1998) states, “Our
tools of [cultural] understanding simultaneously enable and limit our understanding,
empower us and have power over us” (p. 3). From this perspective, Myerson’s (1991)
distinction between the psychology of human perception and culture might not be
precise. Kertzer (1988), in evaluating the work of cognitive psychologists, concludes,
“Behavior is mediated by cognitive constructs. The constructs are similar to what many
anthropologists mean by culture, an integrated body of symbols that structure experience”
(p. 79).
Because the concept is so broad, Myerson’s (1991) reference to societal cultural
norms is not particularly helpful in answering why, within a given society and in the
setting for which the interdependent decision-making model is proposed, different
equilibria might be selected in different circumstances. Further, it is not clear that culture
always functions as a focal-point effect guiding actors to choosing a particular
equilibrium. Koppenjan and Klijn (2004) contrast rational choice theories of human
behavior such as game theory with institutional theories. The latter, they note, “provide a
supra-individual explanation for the behaviour of actors. This is not to say that individual
behaviour is irrelevant, but that this behaviour is influenced by the institutional
conditions in which it occurs” (p. 74). “Institutional theories focus on how institutions
regulate behaviour” (p. 75). Culture is one of the mechanisms through which that
behavior is regulated.
As indicated above, institutional uncertainty is among the factors associated with
wicked problems that give rise to the operation of networks. Variations in cultural

17
influences can be expected to contribute to this uncertainty. As a consequence, it is not
clear that in all instances culture will function as a focal-point effect leading to
cooperation.
The preceding discussion of culture offers a perspective in which the patterns of
behavior of individuals in groups can be examined to identify the norms, values, beliefs,
and expectations of those groups that influence actors in their choice to cooperate. In
doing so, a conscious choice is made not to pursue other sources of motivation such as
individual psychology or cognitive processes. Further, the model restricts its examination
of cultural sources to three that are believed most relevant to the public administrator
actors engaged in decision-making with regard to economic development: political,
organizational, and professional.
Actors engaged in economic development activities come from varied
occupational backgrounds: city management, community development, economic
development, planning, and business, among others. While some of these fit typical
definitions of professions that might have specialized education and training and accepted
standards of professional practice, it is not the case that all do. Consequently, it is to be
expected that the influence of professional or occupational culture will vary from
individual to individual.
In his solution for games of incomplete information, Harsanyi (1967) provides for
participants to be of particular types that are selected with certain probabilities from a
universe of possible types. A given participant in a game will have limited information
about the types of the other participants, leading to uncertainty with regard to the
attributes, and hence the possible actions, of other participants.

18
For the purposes of this model, it is assumed that the types of the individuals
involved are a function of attributes related to local political culture, organizational
cultural, and the professional ethos of the individual participants. Each of these cultural
elements in turn reflects the respective norms, values, beliefs, and expectations of that
element. An individual might be reasonably certain of his or her own type based on the
influences of these three culture elements; that individual will have incomplete
information about how these cultural attributes influence the types of other participants.
Model Simplification
The lack of complete information with regard to participants’ types is complicated
by the range of possible choices that the combination of these three attributes allows.
This complexity presents the problem that Simon (1957) identified in his criticism of
game theory and statistical decision theory: that the boundedness of human rationality
does not permit participants in the decision-making environment to exercise nearly the
level of rationality that the models based on these disciplines require. The model, then,
needs to be simplified if it is to offer a reasonable approximation of the actual
environment of interdependent decision-making.
This simplification can begin by recognizing that the range of outcomes resulting
from each of the three cultural attributes of a participant’s type can be reduced to three
that are of interest in this model: an inclination toward cooperation, an inclination against
cooperation, and neutrality toward cooperation. The overall tendency with regard to
cooperation is derived from combining the effects of this tendency within each of the
cultural influences on the individual participant. The participant will be certain of his own
type with regard to the issue of cooperation; he will be less certain of others’ types but
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will assess the probability that others will be inclined toward cooperation. This
assessment will likely reflect communication and other signals among participants and
the history of prior interactions. While this simplification falls short of the type of
analysis expected of Bayesian players, it is consistent with the level of rationality
suggested by Simon (1955) and the approach that boundedly-rational players could be
expected to use.
The utility of cooperation to the individual participant that is reflected in the
cultural attributes that comprise the participant’s type is not the same as the utility to the
individual in an interdependent decision-making setting. This utility is a function of the
participant’s type and the actions that the individual takes in relation to the types and
actions of other participants. It is easy to conceive of a significant number of possible
decisions that face interdependent actors involved in the implementation of economic
development policies. Fundamentally, however, these various decisions are choices about
whether or not such policies will be pursued independent of other actors or in
collaboration with other actors. The model can be simplified again, then, by recognizing
that the number of actions available to participants in a situation involving social
coordination is two: to cooperate or not.
That the range of combinations of types and actions has been significantly
reduced in this simplified model does not mean that the decision on the part of individual
participants to cooperate with others has been rendered less complex. This simplified
model is intended merely to reflect the decision context within which the actor with
bounded rationality operates. The decision of each actor in the game to cooperate or not
involves a calculation as to whether other actors’ types will incline them toward
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cooperation. This calculation is influenced by each actor’s recognition that all other
actors are engaged in the same calculation.
It is easy to comprehend that the uncertainty that surrounds the decision to
cooperate in an interdependent setting will exist in the first round of a repeated game. But
the action that actors take in that round can be expected to reveal their types. This
revelation lessens the uncertainty with regard to future actions these actors will take but it
does not eliminate it. Some uncertainty will continue to exist. Among the reasons for this
is the fact that cultural influences, while relatively constant, are not immune to
modification. Lane (1992) has proposed a model of rational adaptive choice in which the
success of actions by a group either reinforces the beliefs that are a part of the political
culture or brings about modifications in those beliefs that give rise to different actions.
The same might be expected with any of the three cultural elements. Similarly, Olberding
(2002) has proposed that fostering cooperation among local governments for the purpose
of engaging in regional economic development efforts might be influenced by
environmental factors such as the closure of a major employer or the adoption of a more
regional lifestyle on the part of local residents. External influences might again be
expected to have an impact on the beliefs of participants involved in interdependent
decision-making.
The payoffs to participants in each round of a repeated game are an important
factor to take into account. Let us adopt Simon’s (1955) simplification and assume that
an actor’s utility is + 1 if the actor cooperates and all others do likewise, 0 if the actor
does not cooperate regardless of what others do, and – 1 if the actor cooperates and the
others do not. The positive payoff associated with mutual cooperation only pertains to the
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extent that such an action is not the status quo. Continuing to cooperate to the same
extent (i.e., repeating the same action in the same circumstances) is unlikely to yield
additional benefits to the participant. Cooperation has become the expected norm.
Additional payoffs accrue to participants only to the extent that they enlarge upon
cooperative relationships.
Such an approach, however, might well be an oversimplification that reflects a
generally positive societal view of cooperation. It fails to take into consideration the
actor’s type and the relationship between type and action. This failure, while it facilitates
analysis by making all actors risk neutral, diminishes the utility of the model in
representing reality. Consider the actor whose culture favors noncooperation. For such an
actor, it is unlikely that the payoff for cooperation is positive. It might well be the
opposite, since if payoffs for cooperation were always positive then it is unlikely that a
cultural bias against cooperation would be sustained over time.
In considering payoffs, then, one must take into consideration both the action that
was taken and whether that action was consistent with the actor’s type. The payoff for an
action consistent with an actor’s type is likely to be different than the payoff for an action
contrary to an actor’s type. This is not to suggest, however, that a payoff cannot be
positive if it reflects an action against type. If that were the case, then determining
payoffs would require only knowledge of whether an action was consistent with the
actor’s type. For the same reason as the analysis in the preceding discussion was rejected
as an oversimplification, so too must such an approach be abandoned. It would lead to
situations in which the actor’s type would be immune to the effects of cultural change
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brought about by the actions that actors take. This could only occur if culture were
immutable, something that is known not to be the case.
The significance of this for the analysis of the interdependent decision
environment, both for participant actors and outside observers, is the increase in the
uncertainty of the payoffs in any particular situation. As a reflection of this uncertainty, it
is appropriate to simply the structure of the payoffs such that they can be expressed as
merely +, 0, and -.
To this point, the model has not addressed the impact of more than two actors. It
is likely that in economic development initiatives even in small communities there will be
more than two potential participants in interdependent decision-making. It is reasonable
to assume that benefits will accrue to all those who cooperate, so long as there are at least
two cooperating actors, even if there are some participants who refuse to cooperate. The
choice of differing equilibria is not stable, however, but this instability disappears in
subsequent stages of the game when the cooperative coalition and the non-cooperative
actors again receive payoffs of 0 for the status quo equilibrium.
A graphic representation of the model is presented in Figure 1. It uses as its
starting point the model developed by Lane (1992) and extends it to account for the
interdependent nature of decision-making characteristic of game theory. For the sake of
ease in presentation, a two-person form of the model is shown. This model can be
expanded to an n-person form; such an expansion increases the interconnections among
actors at the point at which actors assign probability to other actors’ types.
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CULTURE
(political;
organizational;
professional)

ACTOR’S TYPE
(cooperative;
neutral;
noncooperative)

FOCAL-POINT
EFFECT

ACTION
(cooperation;
noncooperation)

ACTOR
1

PROBABILITY OF
OTHER ACTOR’S
TYPE

ACTOR
2

PROBABILITY OF
OTHER ACTOR’S
TYPE

ACTOR’S TYPE
(cooperative;
neutral;
noncooperative)

CULTURE
(political;
organizational;
professional)

ACTION
(cooperation;
noncooperation)

PAYOFF
(+ ; 0; -)

PAYOFF
(+ ; 0; -)

FOCAL–POINT
EFFECT

Figure 1. Dynamic, two-actor model of interdependent decision-making showing the
influence of culture, focal-point effects, payoffs, and actions chosen by other actors on
the decision to cooperate. Payoffs are not precisely quantified; instead, they are shown as
positive, negative, or none.
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Model Elaboration
Actors determine the desirability of particular outcomes based on three general
criteria: 1) how cultural factors affect the likelihood to favor cooperation; 2) how cultural
factors influence the response to focal-point effects; and 3) the actions expected of other
actors. The interplay of these criteria and actors’ actions determines their payoffs. In the
first round of play of a game, the model assumes that an actor will have substantially
complete information about the political, organizational, and professional cultural
influences that form the actor’s type (or, at the least, will become aware of this
information through payoffs in the early rounds of repeated interactions). Information
about these same influences on other actors will be incomplete. The actor will also have
knowledge of those environmental factors that represent focal-point effects. The actor
will know that other actors are similarly aware of the focal-point effects but information
about how the culture of the other actors causes them to interpret and respond to those
factors will likewise be incomplete.
In short, the actor will be aware of his/her inclination to cooperate but will be
uncertain as to other actors’ inclination to cooperate. The actor, in the course of play,
prior to any actions, must assign to other actors a probability that they will cooperate.
Consider, then, two actors, one who represents a private economic development
organization and the other representing local government. Both are similarly influenced
by the community’s culture. They are influenced differently, however by the culture of
their respective organizations. The economic development agency is likely to consider
encouraging new business development its priority. For local government, however, the
investment of time and financial resources in such activities diminishes resources
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available for traditional governmental functions that might be of more immediate concern
to citizens. Further, if the actor from the economic development organization is a
professional in that field or has been in the position a long time, his professional ethos is
likely to differ markedly from that of the local government’s city manager.
Similarly, consider the case of elected chief executives of neighboring communities who
are considering cooperation to secure a new development. While they might demonstrate
similar approaches to that task because of similar expectations of their positions, the
cultures of their respective organizations might be quite dissimilar. That of one
government might favor cooperation because it serves to advance an interest in
economizing in the delivery of services while the other organization might favor
independence in its pursuit of a distinct identity.
While the structure of the model assumes a lack of knowledge regarding the
possible actions of other actors, this seems unlikely to be the case for many economic
development scenarios. First, it is reasonable to believe that there will be communication
among actors that will indicate the probability of cooperation. Further, it is unlikely that
all actors will choose their actions simultaneously. Despite these factors, however,
uncertainty regarding actions will remain. Actors will be influenced by their cultures with
regard to whether or not they will act first or delay until other actors have chosen.
What are the strategies that these actors employ? They are expected to be a
function of the payoffs that each actor seeks from the particular circumstance. Achieving
the desired payoff clearly should compel actors to pursue strategies intended to
accomplish that objective. It is worth considering, however, that actors might be unaware
of the strategies necessary to accomplish specific payoffs. Further, it is the characteristic
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of the model that the strategy pursued must take into account the strategy expected to be
employed by others.
To determine what those strategies are, actors will engage in communication with
one another with the expectation that they will receive an indication of the strategies that
others will use. In addition, the history of relations among actors might offer clues as to
how actors will behave in a particular circumstance. Knowledge of the strategies
employed in the past will enable an actor to determine the probability that similar
strategies will be employed in the future.
Actions taken in earlier rounds will enable updating the probability of actors
cooperating in a subsequent round but this knowledge will not eliminate the
incompleteness of this information. The payoffs actors receive in completed rounds will
have the effect of reinforcing or modifying cultural influences actors face. Further, other
focal-point effects will have an impact on the actions selected. What is the impact of a
fiscal crisis on the desire of community officials to offer economic development
incentives? Does a recent history of job loss influence positively or negatively the
willingness to devote energy and resources to attracting new jobs? If a plant that has
closed was a past recipient of tax abatements, will actors be more or less willing to offer
similar incentives in the future?
The variety of factors considered as focal points can make determining
appropriate strategies for actors a particular challenge. New influences are likely to
diminish the reliability of previous actions as a predictor of future actions. On the other
hand, the function of the focal-point effect is to eliminate some of this doubt on the part
of actors by directing their attention to a more limited set of actions or a single action.
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That is, working within the particular cultural environment of the actors, the focal-point
effect eliminates the “noisiness” of the game by focusing the actors’ attention on a
particular solution. Whether any given focal event can have that result, however, is
determined by how that focal event is interpreted within the culture frame of reference of
each actor.
It is reasonable to expect that the actions that actors take in response to a given
focal event will influence responses to other focal events so long as they can be seen as
analogous to the original event. That is, if the actor is likely to interpret a new focal event
as being like the original one, it is expected that the actor will resort to the same action, if
that action resulted in a positive payoff. When a focal event is perceived as significantly
different from the original focal event, or when the actions in response to focal events
come to be seen as ineffective, the actor can be expected to pursue alternative actions.
Payoffs are difficult to determine in advance in a complex game. Utility for an
actor will be a function in part of whether the actor has acted in accordance with his/her
type. In addition, however, payoffs will reflect rewards after the fact in terms of the
response by other external to the play of the game.
It is for this reason, then, that the argument can be made in favor of either all
actors cooperating or all actors not cooperating as the equilibria for the game. Since all
actors reflect the influence of the same local political culture, any actor whose actions are
inconsistent with those of other actors is likely to receive payoffs reflecting the
interpretation that he/she is acting against type. There is no positive reward for standing
apart from the crowd.
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Such a situation is likely to give rise to coalitions or to actions that fall between
cooperation and non-cooperation. These actions, however, fall outside of the equilibria
for the game and, therefore, are unlikely to be chosen except in the expectation that other
actors will likewise choose the same action. Only in the aberrant case of actors who are
unconcerned with the interpretation of unilateral action will the alternative be seen.
Model Limitations
While it has the utility of providing a simplification of reality associated with
game theoretic models, the model presented in Figure 1 lacks the mathematical precision
to predict solution concepts. In this respect, then, it falls short of the rigor associated with
classical game theory.
This lack of rigor is a function in part of the uncertainty associated with various
aspects of the model. O’Toole (1996) noted the problem of uncertainty in rational choice
modeling of implementation networks and highlighted the following sources: lack of
knowledge of participants’ preferences; the large number of participants in
interorganizational settings and the number of actions available to them; the complexity
of the network structure; problems associated with monitoring and enforcement; the
nature of the links between actors and the circumstances leading to interdependence; and
the extent to which there are connections among strategic interactions. “Uncertainty, in
short, poses challenges from a number of directions to the potentially powerful idea of
rational choice analyses of implementation networks” (p. 248). He observes:
Considering interorganizational implementation from the perspective of rational
choice is not futile. Rather, less formal analyses offer potential utility, especially
in terms of management practice. Although it is not possible in most interesting
cases to deduce rigorously modeled predictions regarding actual implementation
settings, the concepts of rational choice provide leverage to scholars of network
management as well as to managers themselves. (O’Toole, 1996, p. 259)
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While the model fails to satisfy the classical conception of a game, it employs
game theory concepts and elements to provide the basis for exploring the extent to which
actors are influenced by cultural elements in their decision to participate in
interorganizational networks. The means of exploring the role of culture in these
networks is described in Chapter 3.
The model as described presents at least two problems. One of the attractions of
classical game theory is the mathematical rigor that it brings to the analysis of strategic
interactions and, thus, the predicative capability that such a rigorous model offers.
Attempting to quantify myriad factors that might influence the decision-making process
for an arena as complex as local economic development is unreasonable. Any model must
be understood as a simplification of reality to be used for analytical purposes without
expecting that it can be applied without qualification to real situations. Recognizing all of
the factors that might influence strategies and payoffs on the part of economic
development actors would make the model unwieldy. Failing to do so, however, leaves
gaps that might affect the ability to apply the model.
Far more serious a problem is the assumption that economic development actors
are Bayes-rational players. It is likely that few if any chamber of commerce executives
calculate probabilities based on Bayes’s Rule before making decisions involving their
strategies in dealing with other local economic development actors. Simon’s (1955)
critique of classical conceptions of rational decision making seems applicable:
My first empirical proposition is that there is a complete lack of evidence that, in
actual human choice situations of any complexity, these computations can be, or
are in fact, performed. The introspective evidence is certainly clear enough, but
we cannot, of course rule out the possibility that the unconscious is a better
decision-maker than the conscious. Nevertheless, in the absence of evidence that
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the classical concepts do describe the decision-making process, it seems
reasonable to examine the possibility that the actual process is quite different from
the ones the rules describe. (p. 104)
While the model has value as a simplification of reality, then, it needs to be
informed by real experiences of real actors in real situations. For much the same reason
that Simon (1955) believed that individuals, when facing a decision involving Nature,
must use alternatives to a rational, comprehensive analysis, so, too, must interdependent
decision makers apply decision rules-of-thumb to the process of determining the
appropriate responses to specific actions on the part of other actors in the economic
development process. Conventional decision-making could consider the likelihood of
achieving the desired end. Interdependent decision-makers must consider the likelihood
of establishing relationships involving repeated interactions with the same or different
actors. The short-hand approaches that are used as real world substitutes for the
application of Bayes’s Rule are to be the subject of field research. In other words, how do
actors behave in these interdependent decision settings?
Research Questions
The research that is the subject of this dissertation addressed the following
questions:
•

How does culture—political, organizational, and professional—influence the
decision of local economic development network participants to cooperate (or
not) in the performance of economic development activities?

•

How do focal-point effects influence the decision of local economic development
network participants to cooperate (or not) in the performance of economic
development activities?
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•

How do payoffs local economic development network participants receive for
cooperating (or failing to cooperate) reinforce cultural biases for or against
cooperation?
It was not assumed that answering these three questions would address in a

comprehensive way all aspects of the fundamental issue of individual motivation and
how it influences the decision to participate in interorganizational networks for the
purpose of policy implementation. Rather, these questions address key components—
culture, focal-point effects, and payoffs—of an interdependent decision-making model
and its application to the field of local economic development.
The model that has been described above reflects the work of other scholars and
in particular those that have considered interdependent decision-making within the
traditions of game theory. The model had not been informed, however, by data obtained
through the examination of the role of culture and focal point effects on cooperation in a
local horizontal network setting. The model’s utility as a simplification of reality is
severely limited, then, since it reflects assumptions about actors’ behavior rather than
actual data. This research was intended to fill this information gap and permit the
modification of the model so that it reflects the experiences of, rather than assumptions
about, actors’ behavior.
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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The intellectual framework for the research described herein rests upon four
pillars: networks, governance, game theory, and culture. Each of these subject areas is
described in turn below.

Networks

A review of the literature of public administration and other disciplines indicates
that scholars find that social coordination takes form generally in accordance with three
pure types: hierarchies, markets, and networks (Agranoff & McGuire, 1998; Agranoff &
McGuire, 2001; Bjork & Johansson, 2001; Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998; O’Toole, 1997;
Painter et al., 1997; Rhodes, 1997; White, 2000). Peters (1998a) sees these three types as
differing responses to the problem of coordination. Bogason and Toonen (1998) position
networks “between states and markets” (p. 205). Considine and Lewis (1999), in their
study of Australian public officials, found that their behaviors aligned along three types
of organizations: procedural; market-corporate, and network.
Definitions
Various definitions of the concept of network are used to describe this
phenomenon: “organizational interconnectedness for associating with others who hold
similar interests, in order to develop and access ideas, information, support, and other
resources that enable network members to improve what they are doing . . . or achieve a
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goal” (Kurtz, 1998, p. 57); “multiorganizational arrangements for solving problems that
cannot be achieved, or achieved easily, by single organizations” (Agranoff & McGuire,
2001, p. 296); “structures of interdependence involving multiple organizations or parts
thereof, where one unit is not merely the formal subordinate of the others in some larger
hierarchical arrangement” (O’Toole, 1997, p. 45); and “social structures that permit
interorganizational interactions of exchange, concerted action and joint production”
(Agranoff & McGuire, 1999, p. 20).
Within the public administration literature, perspectives of networks are related to
their history in either policy studies or organizational studies (Considine & Lewis, 1999).
Peters (1998b) writes, “The concept of networks actually grew out of the more restricted
concepts of interest group politics in the United States” (p. 22). Rhodes and Marsh (1992)
describe a typology of policy networks ranging from the smaller, more focused policy
community to the larger, more loosely structured issue network that includes professional
networks, intergovernmental networks, and producer networks.
Mingus (2001) criticizes this typology for, among other reasons, its inapplicability
to network implementation issues. Attempts to distinguish among network forms
involved in program implementation generally focus on how tightly coupled
organizations are and/or the degree of formality in the network. Brinkerhoff (1999)
distinguishes between formalized network mechanisms that “appear to be more
appropriate for networks whose objectives focus on service delivery” (p. 140) and
informal or ad hoc mechanisms “more suited to networks with initially more diffuse
objectives, or where the ultimate path of the network is not initially clear” (p. 140). Kettl
(2000) notes that networks are “sometimes formally constructed through contracts and
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other legal agreements and sometimes informally drawn through pragmatic working
relationships” (p. 494). Agranoff (2006) adopts this distinction as well, referring to
networks as chartered or nonchartered.
Mandell (1999a, 1999b, 2001) and Keast, Mandell, Brown and Woolcock (2004)
have attempted to bring some order to the discussion of these interorganizational
relationships by contrasting networking, networks and network structures. Networking
“is a common term that refers to people making connections with each other” (Keast et
al., 2004, p. 364). “This is a critical step in being able to accomplish individual efforts
through establishing contacts with key people” (Mandell, 1999b, p. 5).
Networks and network structures range along a continuum characterized by the
degree of formality in linkages and the strength of the commitment to collaboration.
Networks are established when networking becomes more formalized. “Networks may
involve simultaneous action by a number of different actors, but each of these actions
represents the actions of independently operating organizations” (Mandell, 1999b, p. 7).
Keast et al. (2004) describe the genesis of network structures:
Network structures [italics omitted] occur when working separately—even while
maintaining links with each other—is not enough. . . . A network structure forms
when these people realize they (and the organizations they represent) are only one
small piece of the total picture. It is a recognition that only by coming together to
actively work on accomplishing a broad, common mission will goals be
accomplished. (p. 364)
Mandell (1999a) writes that a network structure “consists of public, private and
not-for-profit organizations and/or individuals in an active, organized collaboration to
accomplish some agreed upon purpose or purposes” (p. 44). Network structures “are
distinguished from public-private partnerships or alliances because they are not based on
contractual relationships” (p. 44) but rather are “based on exchanges which rely on
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interpersonal relationships” (p. 44). She notes that network structures lack the hierarchy
or traditional organizations and rely on “’mind set’ or commitment” (p. 45) to achieve
coordination. Mandell (1994) refers to this as program rationale.
This attempt to make sense of the myriad definitions of networks, while creating
the foundation for a research agenda centered on network structures, does not offer quite
the specificity for other network forms one might hope. While Mandell (2001) refers to
organizational units as network members, a usage adopted by McGuire (2002), Mandell
(1999b) and Keast et al. (2004), on the other hand, refer to both individuals and
organizations as members of network structures. Further, the degree of formality required
of networks is unclear. Mandell (1994) cites Chisolm’s (1989) study of the San Francisco
Bay area transit system as an example of a network characterized by informal relations,
but Mandell (1999b) and Keast et al. cite the same study as an example of the formality
required for networks.
The use of the term networking appears to introduce social network theory from
sociology into the discussion of interorganizational networks. Newman (2003) describes
a social network as “a set of people or groups of people with some pattern of contacts or
interactions between them” (p. 174) and cites examples of social networks based on
friendship, marriage, and work relationships. One type of social network identified by
Newman is collaboration networks, which are “typically affiliation networks in which
participants collaborate in groups or one kind or another, and links between pairs of
individuals are established by common group membership” (p. 175).
Agranoff (2006) is careful to exclude social networks from the arena of
interorganizational networks. McGuire (2002), however, in discussing network
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management, appears to blend the two, indicating, “In keeping with recent public
administration research, I do not define networks as purely sociological phenomena” (p.
600). Berry et al. (2004), in reviewing networks in the research traditions of sociology,
political science, and public management, advocate incorporating social network analysis
into public management scholarship.
Relying on social network theory, Thurmaier and Wood (2002) use the term
“network” to refer to interlocal agreements in describing relationships among
governments in the Kansas City Metropolitan Area, indicating that these agreements are
“a subset of public management networks” (p. 585):
A local government can be involved in many dyadic relationships with other local
governments. Each of the other local governments, in turn, can be involved in
dyadic relationships with other local governments. Together, the set of dyadic
relations forms a macro-level social structure that comprises a set of actors in a
social network. (p. 587)
Lowndes and Skelcher (1998), however, discourage the easy use of the term for
such relationships:
Partnerships are associated with a variety of forms of social co-ordination—
including network, hierarchy and market. The failure to distinguish between
partnerships as organizational manifestations and the modes of social coordination that accompany them has constrained theoretical development and
empirical investigation of this important field. (p. 314)
Networks in Practice
Whether networks are a distinct organizational form has been questioned by
Bogason and Toonen (1998) who raise the possibility that networks represent merely a
new paradigm in describing aspects of traditional organization, a different way “of
looking at and analyzing traditional government and public sector structures” (p. 205).
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Peters (1998b) reflects a similar view by raising the question of whether networks are a
metaphor or a model.
Agranoff and McGuire (1998) have determined that “researchers are solidly
building the case that networks are the norm in public management” (p. 88). Kettle
(2000) writes that “since the maturation of traditional administrative theory in the 1930s,
interorganizational networks have been steadily growing in importance, and they show no
sign of facing away” (p. 494). White (2000) notes:
Commentators have said that there has been an effort to shift the balance between
government and society towards sharing tasks and responsibilities and towards
doing things together instead of doing them alone. The shift is a reaction to
changes to society and government that can be seen as one of copying [sic] with
the growing dynamics, complexity and diversity within society. This shift,
alongside the present concern for governance, has brought about a growth in a
number of organizational forms. (p. 243)
In using the science of complexity, White (2000) seeks to resolve the conundrum
presented by Bogason and Toonen (1998):
Thinking in terms of complexity, on the other hand, sees structures as a
manifestation of an underlying process. The entire web of relationships is
intrinsically dynamic. Thus organizational complexity can be associated with a
web of interrelationships of actors or within and between organizations. Processes
to use to help these organizations achieve effective governance would need to be
able to absorb the dynamic, complex and diverse characteristic work of these
organizations. (p. 248)
What seems clear, however, regardless of the manner in which “networks” is
used, is that it serves the primary purpose of addressing problems associated with
information exchange and uncertainty. “Network management is based on information
rather than authority. The network manager seeks to achieve cooperation among actors
while minimizing and removing informational and interactional blockages to the
cooperation” (McGuire, 2002, p. 603).
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While Peters (1998a) sees networks as a response to the problem of coordination,
Agranoff and McGuire (1998) indicate that “networks are not merely mechanisms for
coordination; they are arrangements for solving interorganizational problems that cannot
be achieved by single organizations” (p. 70). In much the same way that individuals form
organizations for the purpose of overcoming the limits of rationality, so too do networks
overcome the limits of organizational rationality. Painter et al. (1997) found that “the sum
total of the changes at the local level is to make the environment more problematic so that
it is unlikely that any organization will now possess the resources, skills and knowledge
to operate effectively on their [sic] own” (p. 231). Whether networks are informal and so
involve primarily information exchange among participants that yields enhancements in
organizational performance or whether new organizations are formed to link these
individual organizations, the results are the same.
Gulati and Gargiulo (1999) note the view that “organizations create ties to
manage uncertain environments” (p. 1440). This environment is an outcome of social
change that calls for alternative organizational structures. Agranoff and McGuire (2001)
characterize bureaucracy as “the signature organizational form during the industrial age”
(p. 319). In the information age, on the other hand, work spans organizational and
geographic boundaries and its coordination more complex than that for which hierarchy
is well suited. “An organization based on individuation, dispersed power, and unification
is necessary; the network is that form” (p. 319).
This manner of organizing might well find its most effective application in
addressing so-called wicked problems or wicked issues. Rittel and Webber (1973) “use
the term ‘wicked’ in a meaning akin to that of ‘malignant’ (in contrast to ‘benign’) or
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‘vicious’ (like a circle) or ‘tricky’ (like a leprechaun) or ‘aggressive’ (like a lion, in
contrast to the docility of a lamb)” (p. 160). They state:
As distinguished from problems in the natural sciences, which are definable and
separable and may have solutions that are findable, the problems of governmental
planning—and especially those of social or policy planning—are ill-defined; and
they rely upon elusive political judgment for resolution. (Not “solution.” Social
problems are never solved. At best they are only re-solved—over and over again.)
(p. 160)
Lowndes and Skelcher (1998) identify the “complexity and intransigence of the
‘wicked issues’… facing government” (p. 315) as one of the rationales of the
development of multi-organizational partnerships. O’Toole (1997) notes that a
fundamental characteristic of hierarchy is the capability to accomplish complex tasks by
dividing them into “small, relatively independent components that can be treated
separately” (p. 46). Non-traditional organizational forms might be better suited to
addressing “challenges that cannot be handled by dividing them up into simple pieces in
isolation from each other” (p. 46).
Policy Implementation Networks
A focus on the process of accomplishing tasks permits a distinction between
policy implementation networks and the range of others that can be included within the
descriptions above. O’Toole, Hanf, and Hupe (1997) describe implementation networks
as a type of policy network and note that:
One difference between the use of networks in the management of
implementation compared with other phases of the policy process lies in the fact
that during the implementation phase the tasks to be performed—oriented as they
are to more specific objectives or problem-solving activities—will tend to be
more narrow and concrete. (p. 137)
O’Toole (2000) defines policy implementation as “what develops between the
establishment of an apparent intention on the part of government to do something, or to
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stop something, and the ultimate impact in the world of action” (p. 266). Regarding
implementation networks, he notes:
Clearly a multiactor approach to understanding implementation offers a shift from
the standard world presented in conventional organizational theory. The former
presents the pressing issue of how to concert action in the absence of operational
authority and across institutional lines. (p. 266)
In considering interorganizational policy implementation, O’Toole and Montjoy
(1984) highlighted the challenge of fostering cooperation and found that
“interorganizational problems are caused, in part, by the lack of attention to and
incentives for coordination among organizations. Olberding (2002) found that norms of
cooperation were important in the initial formation of regional partnerships for economic
development, although they were less significant in determining partnership structure and
processes.
Exemplifying the network approach to policy implementation, Blair (2000) cites
examples from the state of Nebraska linking the general process of devolution to local
economic development practices that foster use of non-traditional management methods
such as the new public management. He notes that local governments retain
responsibility for reporting to the state regarding community activities but indicates that
“a number of governments and mixture of private and nonprofit organizations cooperate
in a network structure to deliver the benefits of economic development policy” (p. 522).

Governance

Definitions
Any consideration of networks or other forms for providing for social
coordination must be considered in the light of current discussions regarding governance.
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In present usage in the public administration literature, it would seem that the term
“governance” is intended to distinguish methods and structures employed in the delivery
of public services from traditional administrative methods employed through hierarchical,
bureaucratic organizational structures. Bjork and Johansson (2001) observe that “the term
governance is used, generally speaking, to reflect that the conditions for governing
society have changed” (p. 2). Rhodes (1997) writes:
In current use governance stands for a change in the meaning of government,
referring to: a new process of governing; or a changed condition of ordered rule;
or the new method by which society is governed. Inevitably, there are several
contending meanings for the term. It refers to, for example, the minimal state;
corporate governance; the new public management; and “good governance.” (p.
xi)
The present interest in governance is not necessarily reflective of recent
innovations in the production and delivery of public services. As Peters and Pierre (1998)
note, “the debate over governance may simply be the academic community catching up
with the reality of the public sector in the contemporary world” (p. 240).
“Governance” is distinguished from conventional conceptions of “government”
and carries differing implications depending upon geographic context. One perspective of
the distinction between the two terms is conveyed by Savitch and Vogel (2000):
“Whereas government is vertical and firmly institutionalized, governance is horizontal
and flexible. Whereas government is formal and directed from above, governance is
informal and self-regulating” (p. 161).
European and American Contexts
In discussions regarding public enterprises in Europe, references to governance
are generally taken to mean an alternative to government in which formerly governmental
functions are performed by nongovernmental entities. In the United States, on the other
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hand, perhaps owing to its federal system, governance connotes alternatives to traditional
hierarchical organizations through which government services are provided.
In its European context, a discussion of “governance without government” (Kettl,
2000; Peters & Pierre, 1998) is a meaningful way of conveying the sense that programs
and services formerly provided by government bureaucracies are now more likely to
involve the for-profit and nonprofit sectors. Governance is seen as “the ‘third way,’ a way
between the market and the state” (Bjork and Johansson, 2001, p. 2). In this context,
describing governance as reflective of network models is particularly appropriate (Peters
& Pierre, 1998). The various aspects of the governance debate, when considered in total,
“amount to a prescription for steering society through less direct means and weakening
the power of the State to control policy” (Peters & Pierre, 1998, p. 225). This is clearly an
outgrowth of recent emphasis on neo-classical economics and reflects theorizing on
topics such as public choice and the new public management. Peters and Pierre state:
The emerging forms of governance we see in several of the advanced western
democracies should be conceived of as alternative models of the pursuit of
collective interest (Peters, 1996). Thus governance is essentially a political
theory—insofar as it describes a certain type of exchange between the state and
the society—whereas [new public management] is an organizational theory. (p.
232)
In examining European local government, Pierre (1999) equates the difference
between government and governance to the distinction between institution and process.
He argues that urban governance be understood as the coordination of public and private
interests. While institutions reflect “different systems of values, norms, beliefs and
practices” (p.375), governance encompasses “processes of regulation, coordination, and
control” (p. 376). He warns against considering these processes outside their institutional
framework. “Focusing strictly on governance entails risks of conceptual
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oversimplification and reductionism. If governance, loosely defined, refers to any publicprivate exchange, then soon everything becomes governance” (p. 376).
Some of these same characteristics are evident on the American scene as well but
discussions regarding governance take on influences unique to the historical traditions of
the administrative state. The “stateless” origins of United States government (Peters &
Pierre, 1998; Stillman, 1999) and its federal system have contributed to a tendency
toward a less than unified approach to the delivery of public services. Current theorizing
with regard to American governance, then, reflects this lack of unity. Its present
recognition is perhaps reflective of experimentation in addressing increasingly complex
issues but is also likely due to a greater decentralization of government functions and the
greater use of for-profit and non-profit providers in service provision. In this respect,
similarities with Europe are evident. Comparisons between European and American
governance are limited, however, by distinct institutional and historical factors. “The very
absence of a strong state tradition in the United States appears to make moving to the
fully networked model of governance less likely” (Peters & Pierre, p. 238). This
observation notwithstanding, Peters and Pierre find that the American federal system
permits “greater latitude in governing and management” (p. 239) among state and local
governments.
This latitude has been found in the use of intergovernmental mechanisms to
coordinate service delivery, a trend evident in current considerations of sub-state
regionalism (Hamilton, 2000, 2002; Savitch & Vogel, 2000; Thurmaier & Wood, 2002).
Savitch and Vogel (2000) note that governance:
conveys the notion that existing institutions can be harnessed in new ways, that
cooperation can be carried out on a fluid and voluntary basis among localities, and
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that people can best regulate themselves through horizontally linked
organizations. Governance also recognizes that localities can provide public
services without necessarily producing them. (p. 161)
The implications of alternative forms of governance for local governments,
whether or not they are involved in regionalism initiatives, is noted by Kettl (2000) in his
discussion of the meaning of welfare reform initiatives during the Clinton presidency:
Welfare reform marks the maturation of a generation-long trend that
fundamentally transformed community governance. It is a trend with great
political attraction: It wires local nongovernmental groups directly into the service
system, and it allows government to increase its reach without increasing its size.
It spreads administrative responsibility, and hence political risk. It provides a way
to tailor broad programs to community needs. (p. 493)
The newness of these discussions about governance prevents identification of a
theory of governance and, more appropriately, results in theories of governance (Pierre,
1999) and the consideration of multiple forms through which government functions are
carried out.
Governance and Relationships
Efforts to make sense of this experimentation can obscure the organic nature of
American governance. Considine and Lewis (1999) note that “less attention has been
given to the way ordinary officials reshape their roles in these times of significant
structural change” (p. 468). In examining this issue, they have found that the work of
public officials is affected by the organizational structures and systems resulting from
public sector reform initiatives. Further, inter-agency relations within a particular
program area show evidence of “contending strategies” (p. 475). Feldman and
Khademian (2002) extend this perspective:
Another way to think about these [governance] structures, however, is as
relationships. Each structure, at its core, is a relationship involving a public
manager and other participants in the governing process. . . . Managers operate in
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a myriad of such relationship structures to develop processes for making
decisions, implementing policy, and identifying public priorities in the first place;
these relationships give form, pose constraints, or present opportunities for the
way public policy is pursued. (p. 542)
By focusing on the nature of the relationships in which public managers are
involved, Feldman and Khademian (2002) find that distinctions may be drawn between
their conception of the role of the public manager in governance and that provided for
under the principal-agent theory of governance. They suggest that governance structures
are “dynamic relationships that are influenced by the decisions and actions of public
managers” (p. 544). Governance, then, is conceptualized as “multiple and reciprocal
relationships that constrain and enable actions taken in a policy arena” (p. 551).
Pierre (1999) warns against too easy a conceptualization of the processes through
which governance structures, or institutions, reflect the choices of institutional actors:
This leads to the question of whether cities proactively choose a particular
governance model or whether these models are artifacts of external dependencies
and tensions within the city administration. What is at issue here is the role of
local government in governance. . . . [T]he structuring of governance—the
inclusion or exclusion of different actors and the selection of instruments—is not
value neutral but is embedded in, and sustains, political values above and beyond
urban partisan division. (p. 390)
To sum up the impressions derived from this review of the literature leads to the
suggestion that interorganizational networks represent a model for the delivery of public
services within the larger context of experimentation with such forms that is termed
“governance.” That there are non-traditional (i.e., non-hierarchical and non-market)
organizational means through which such services are provided begs the question as to
the tools that organizational decision-makers use in operating within such a setting.
In addressing this issue, Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan (1997a) note distinctions
between public management and governance:
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All kinds of actors are involved in governance, if only because government does
not perform all the governing itself. A wide variety of actions from different
actors has consequences for governance. . . . Public management differs from
governance in that it focuses on the consciously and deliberately undertaken
actions of public actors to influence societal process (or policy process).
Therefore, public management is governance, but not all governance is public
management. (p. 2)
To attempt to utilize public management principles and practices to understand
decision-making and resultant actions within interorganizational networks likely misses
some of the influences on this process. Of particular interest is the decision as to whether
or not to cooperate with other community organizations in service delivery. More
appropriately, given the role for individual actors in structuring such service delivery
systems, how do individual actors make interdependent decisions with regard to
coordinating actions through networks?
This question is addressed in part in comments by Peters (1998a):
Interorganizational theory appears to argue that the repeated interactions define
the existence of a network. Hierarchies or even markets are able to allocate
resources in a single interaction, but for networks to form there must be some
repetition and stability. In this sense the network analysis approaches some
versions of institutional theory in arguing for the need to institutionalize a pattern
of relationship that can then define mutual expectations and mutual dependence.
(pp. 305-306)

Game Theory

There remains a tendency, whether discussing governance generally or networks
in particular, to examine the phenomenon from the perspective of the primary
government actor or actors, regardless of the inevitable involvement of actors from other
sectors in the process of governing. Perhaps owing to this tendency, there are a number of
examples in the literature on interorganizational networks that attempt to comprehend the
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management of such networks from the perspective of traditional, or modified, public
administration processes. Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan (1997b) devote a book to the
topic of network management and Agranoff and McGuire (2001) ask whether there exists
a PODSCORB equivalent for network management. O’Toole et al. (1997) argue that “it
does not make sense to speak of “the network manager” (p. 140), but continue:
There may at times be someone or some subgroup of actors trying to bring
together a set of individual actors who will support and be able to move towards
resolution of a particular problem or will work to implement a certain policy or
programme. (p. 140)
Grafting newer forms of organizing for provision of public services onto
traditional notions of public administration can distract attention from the relevant issues
of the interactive nature of these personal relationships. Even if considered solely or
predominantly from the perspective of the public actor, the practice of administration
must reflect the role of other actors, some of whom might not share a public
administration background or ethos.
Decision-Making
Of particular interest, then, is the manner in which decisions are made within the
context of interorganizational networks. Traditional perspectives from public
administration posit a single individual or organization concerned with determining the
appropriate response to the particular circumstances at hand. The public administration
literature concerns itself with means of describing the manner in which the process of
making a decision is undertaken. These approaches to decisions, however, are premised
upon a single actor (whether individual or organization) against Nature; that is, all
circumstances outside the individual or the organization.
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These models of decision-making might well be appropriate to hierarchical forms
of social coordination, whether they are public or private. The nature of
interorganizational networks, however, leads one to consider whether such models are
appropriate to an environment characterized both by the presence of wicked problems
and by the participation of multiple actors all concerned with addressing such problems.
If the nature of networks is such that decisions on the part of an individual actor may not
be considered authoritative or decisive for all participant actors, then it is worth
considering whether other approaches to decision-making that focus on the
interdependent nature of the actors involved might not be more appropriate (Simon &
Associates, 1986).
Game Theory Overview
A significant body of literature on the interaction of interdependent actors is
found within the field of game theory. (A glossary of terms relevant to an understanding
of game theory is found in Appendix A.) The principles of game theory were originally
elucidated with regard to the mathematical analysis of strategies employed by players of
parlor games. That the theory references games makes its subject appear more frivolous
than is actually the case. From the perspective of game theory, a game “involves
situations in which individuals are aware that their actions affect one another” (Gates &
Humes, 1997, p. 1). A game “is a specification of the strategies each of several ‘players’
have [sic], the order in which players choose strategies, the information players have, and
how players rate the desirability (‘utility’) of resulting outcomes” (Camerer, 2004, p.
374).
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The recognition of the application of game theory to a broader range of social
situations expanded in 1944 with the publication of Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior by John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern. This book and similar early
treatments of the topic were concerned with cooperative games, in which binding
contracts are possible, and zero sum games, in which one player’s gain is equivalent to
another player’s loss. While this literature was of value during Cold War era
considerations of the nuclear arms race, it would be of limited applicability to many of
the situations in which actors in interorganizational networks are involved.
The applicability of game theory was significantly enlarged by the work of John
Nash in the early 1950s. In his doctoral dissertation, Nash established the foundation of
noncooperative game theory by demonstrating the existence of equilibria in games. He
showed that every noncooperative game has at least one equilibrium, a point at which no
player could improve his payoff through a unilateral move. All of game theory today
stems from this early work by Von Neumann and Morgenstern and Nash.
Prisoners’ Dilemma
In game theory, interdependent interactions are modeled through the use of a
variety of games that vary depending upon factors such as available strategies and
payoffs to participants. The best known of these games is the Prisoners’ Dilemma. Two
criminals are arrested. The evidence available to authorities is sufficient to convict each
of them of a petty crime carrying a penalty of one year in jail. While they are held in
separate cells from which they cannot communicate with one another, a deal is proposed.
If one cooperates by implicating his partner in a more serious crime that they are believed
to have committed, the partner will go to prison for 10 years while the one who
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cooperated will go free. If both implicate their partners, they will both go to prison for 5
years.
The Prisoners’ Dilemma can be presented in the following matrix, Figure 2, also
known as the strategic form of the game. It presents the players in the game, the strategies
available to each of them and the payoffs, in this case presented as the number of years in
jail. By convention, the payoff for the row players is presented first in each cell of the
matrix followed by the payoff for the column player.
If the prisoners cooperate with one another and remain silent, they will each go to
jail for a year. This is not an equilibrium point, however, since by individual action, each
of them may improve his position by defecting from cooperation and implicating his
partner, resulting in no time spent in jail.

Prisoner 2
Cooperate

Defect

Cooperate

1,1

10,0

Defect

0,10

5,5

Prisoner 1

Figure 2. Prisoner’s Dilemma game payoffs. The payoff for the row player is the first
number in each pair. The equilibrium strategy in this game is when both players defect.

In classical game theory, the rationality of the actors is a key feature. In the
Prisoners’ Dilemma example, it is assumed that each of the players knows the game that
is being played, knows the strategies available to both players, and knows the payoffs to
both players. What is more, it is assumed that each player knows that the other player
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knows these things, that the other player knows that the first player knows that the other
player knows, and so forth.
Since it is well known that there is no honor among thieves, and because the
prisoners cannot communicate with one another, each prisoner can assume that the other
will defect since that is the action that leads to freedom. Both know this, however, so
both defect, leading to prison terms that are far longer than if both had remained silent.
This is the equilibrium point in the Prisoners’ Dilemma. From that position, neither
prisoner may unilaterally improve his payoff. This is not the Pareto optimal solution for
the prisoners since the payoffs are inferior to those that might be realized had the parties
cooperated. Nevertheless, it is the equilibrium for this particular game.
That actors involved in interdependent decision-making might take actions that
collectively result in less-than-optimal outcomes seems inconsistent with traditional
public administration perspectives on planning and decision-making in which optimal, or
at least acceptable, results are the goal. Because actors in network settings might well be
affected by, and must take into account, actions by others beyond his control, however,
game theory has value in characterizing this approach to social coordination.
The field of game theory is much broader than the consideration of the Prisoners’
Dilemma would indicate. In addition to distinguishing between zero sum and non-zero
sum games and cooperative and noncooperative games, the analysis distinguishes
between 2-person and n-person games, between games of imperfect information and
games of incomplete information, between one-shot and repeated games, and so forth.
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Stag Hunt Game
Stag Hunt is an example of a game with multiple equilibria. It is called an
assurance game because “a person would be willing to cooperate as long as that person
were assured that the partner would cooperate as well” (Kollock, 1998, p. 186). It is
based on a suggestion from Rousseau (1754/1987), highlighted in Chapter 1, that
individuals must cooperate to hunt a deer but an individual acting alone will be able only
to take a rabbit. As the following matrix indicates, there are two equilibria in the stag
hunt game: when both players cooperate to hunt the stag or when they both hunt rabbits
individually. While the latter is an equilibrium position, however, it is not Pareto optimal
since the players might improve their payoffs by cooperating to hunt the stag.

Hunter 2
Stag

Hare

Stag

2,2

0,1

Hare

1,0

1,1

Hunter 1

Figure 3. Stag Hunt game payoffs. The payoff for the row player is the first number in
each pair. There are two equilibria in this game: when both players hunt stag and when
both players hunt hare.

Game Theory Traditions
In addition to the tradition of classical game theory, researchers may approach
game theory from the perspective of evolutionary game theory, adaptive learning models,
and behavioral game theory. A distinguishing feature of the various alternative
approaches to game theory is the amount of rationality the players are assumed to
possess. As noted above, classical game theory assumes high levels of rationality. On the
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other end of the spectrum, evolutionary game theory does not require rationality at all and
instead finds strategies driven by replicator dynamics that will result in evolutionarily
stable strategies. (See Katz, 2000, pp. 269-339.) In lieu of rational individuals playing
games to their conclusion, evolutionary game theory bases its approach on large
populations of individuals. Gintis (2000) notes:
Classical game theory describes socially and temporally isolated encounters,
while evolutionary game theory describes macro-social behavioural regularities.
The actors in classical game theory are payoff maximizers whose identity remains
fixed during the course of play. By contrast, in evolutionary game theory, the
players are constantly changing, and the central actor is a replicator—an entity
having some means of making approximately accurate copies of itself. The
replicator can be a gene, a species, a strategy, a belief, a technique, a convention,
or a more general institutional or cultural form. (p. 300)
Axelrod (1984), in the much cited The Evolution of Cooperation, notes that “the
evolutionary approach is based on a simple principle: whatever is successful is likely to
appear more often in the future” (p. 169). Through the use of computer simulations
running competing strategies in finitely repeated 2-person Prisoners’ Dilemma games, he
demonstrated that the most effective strategy employed was a simple tit-for-tat strategy.
The player would initially cooperate and then repeat whatever strategy was employed by
the opponent in the previous move. The results of these simulations led Axelrod to the
following conclusion:
Since the Prisoner’s Dilemma is so common in everything from personal relations
to international relations, it would be useful to know how best to act when in this
type of setting. However, . . . there is no one best strategy to use. What is best
depends in part on what the other player is likely to be doing. Further, what the
other is likely to be doing may well depend on what the player expects you to do.
(p. 27)
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Young (1998) offers an adaptive learning model of game theory that seeks to
provide a middle ground between the hyper-rational actors assumed by classical game
theory and the non-rational participants in evolutionary games. He writes:
I postulate a world in which people base their decisions on limited data, use
simple predictive models and sometimes do unexplained or even foolish things.
Over time, such simple adaptive learning processes can converge to quite
complex equilibrium patterns of behavior. Indeed a surprising number of classical
solution concepts in game theory can be recovered via this route. (p. xi)
Young (1998) bases his work on that of Thomas Schelling who “showed how
micro decisions by many individuals evolve into recognizable patterns of macro
behavior” (p. xii). He contrasts this approach with that of evolutionary game theorists
with their reliance on evolutionarily stable strategies. His adaptive learning model posits
an alternative conception of equilibrium that he calls stochastic stability, reflecting the
capacity of a system to withstand “persistent random shocks” (p. xii) as compared to the
isolated shocks more characteristic of evolutionarily stable strategies. Like evolutionary
game theorists, Young is concerned with macro behaviors and relies not upon single
actors playing a game to its conclusion but on individual actors drawn randomly from a
large pool of possible actors. These actors “are not perfectly rational and fully informed
about the world in which they live. They base their decisions on fragmentary information,
they have incomplete models of the process they are engaged in, and they may not be
especially forward looking” (p. 6). From this beginning, Young demonstrates how
societal conventions may evolve from “the uncoordinated actions of many individuals”
(p. 144). He concludes by noting:
When an interaction occurs over and over again and involves a changing cast of
characters, a feedback loop is established whereby past experiences of some
agents shape the current expectations of other agents. This process yields
predictable patterns of equilibrium and disequilibrium behavior that can be
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construed as social and economic “institutions,” that is, established customs,
usages, norms, and forms of organizations. (p. 144)
Behavioral game theory provides an alternative means of addressing the limited
rationality of players by accounting for actual decisions made by game participants. By
way of example, consider a game in which an individual wins by coming closest to
guessing the average number between 1 and 100 that will be selected by all other players
of the game. For the rational player, it is not enough to simply determine the average of
the guesses. He must also assume that all other players will be determining the average
and base their decisions on what others decide, thus driving the average lower. After a
sufficient number of iterations of this process, all players will conclude that the only
rational answer to this problem is zero.
In actual experiments, however, players do not select zero. They proceed through
several steps of iterative thinking, but eventually get to a point at which they reach the
limits of their mental capacity to pursue this line of reasoning. Likewise, in other
experiments, results do not yield the equilibria that classical game theory suggests, but
alternatives that reflect other factors participants bring to the game. Camerer (2003)
provides a comprehensive survey of results of game theory experiments indicating that
real people, or at least the real college students that tend to be the subjects in such
experiments, do not behave strictly in accordance with the predictions of classical game
theory models.
These alternatives to classical game theory attempt to address the social and
psychological limits of the rationality of actors involved in strategic interactions.
Classical game theory, while developing models based on completely rational actors, also
concerned itself with addressing the boundedness of rationality. A class of games that
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presented a problem for game theorists were those of incomplete information. A game is
a game of incomplete information if the players’ strategies and payoffs are not common
knowledge or if uncertainty exists concerning them. That is, some players possess private
information. Game theorists were unable to find satisfactory solutions to such games until
Harsanyi (1967) demonstrated that these games might be reconceptualized as games of
imperfect information played by actors employing Bayes’s rule in assigning conditional
probability to information about which uncertainty existed.
Despite the progress made in game theory to address concerns with regard to the
limits to the rationality of participants, those desirous of using a game-theoretic approach
to modeling network decision-making processes might be advised to remain mindful of
Simon’s (1957) critique of the approach taken in classical game theory and statistical
decision theory:
It is wrong in precisely the same way that classical economic theory is wrong—in
assuming that rational choice is a choice among objectively given alternatives
with objectively given consequences that reflect accurately all the complexities of
the real world. It is wrong, in short, in ignoring the principle of bounded
rationality, in seeking to erect a theory of human choice on the unrealistic
assumption of virtual omniscience and unlimited computational power. (p. 202)

Culture

Wildavsky (1987) believes that the economic rationality at the foundation of
game theory does not adequately explain the origin of preferences because economic
models of human behavior take preferences as given. He proposes explaining this
behavior through what he terms cultural rationality. He states, “An act is culturally
rational . . . if it supports one’s way of life” (p. 6). Lane (1992) addresses a possible
criticism of the concept of cultural rationality—that its use provides a mechanism through
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which everything can be considered rational—by offering a perspective “which
emphasizes the specific content of various political cultures (plural), and shows how
these specific norms and beliefs can be described and used to predict specific behavior
patterns” (p. 365). Orren (1988) expands upon this perspective when be observes,
“Political research over the last thirty years suggest that self-interest, group
identifications, and ideological goals all [italics added] influence thought and action
significantly” (p. 24).
Wildavsky’s (1987) definition of culture—“shared values legitimating different
patterns of social practices” (p. 5)—is far from universally accepted. Kroeber and
Kluckhohn (1952) undertook an exhaustive survey of the word culture since its first use
in an anthropological context in 1871. They found 164 different definitions. From their
point of view, culture is a logical construct that is “based upon the study of behavior and
behavioral products. It returns to behavior and behavioral products in that the concept of
culture makes more behavior intelligible and, to an appreciable extent, makes possible
predictions about behavior in particular areas” (p. 189). At the time of their writing, the
consensus of social scientists was that:
Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior acquired
and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievement of human
groups, including their embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of culture
consists of traditional (i.e., historically derived and selected) ideas and especially
their attached values; cultural systems may, on the one hand be considered as
products of action, on the other as conditioning elements of further action. (p.
181)
The existence of this consensus did not preclude the subsequent development of
other definitions of culture, Schein (2004) discovered, nor did it prevent his proposing
another:
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The culture of a group can now be defined as a pattern of shared basic
assumptions that was learned by a group as it solved its problems of external
adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered
valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive,
think, and feel in relation to those problems [italics omitted]. (p. 17)
Schein’s (2004) definition “does not include overt behavior patterns’ (p. 19), a
characteristic that distinguishes it from that given by Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952).
This apparent discrepancy is clarified by Schein (1996b) when he notes, “Overt behavior
alone [italics added] cannot be used to decipher culture because situational contingencies
often make us behave in a manner that is inconsistent with our deeper values and
assumptions” (p. 11).
The definitions are similar in their emphasis on patterns, that culture is a
characteristic of the social life of individuals, that it is a product of the history of the
group, and that it reflects things that the group values. Schein (2004) identifies three
levels of culture: underlying assumptions; espoused beliefs and values; and artifacts. The
first two may be seen as corresponding to the implicit and explicit patterns noted by
Kroeber and Kluckhohn.
Political Culture
For Wildavsky (1987), political culture is expressed through the political
institutions that people create. He states, “Put plainly, people decide for or against
existing authority. They construct their culture in the process of decision making. Their
continuing reinforcement, modification, and rejection of existing power relationships
teaches them what to prefer” (p. 5). He offers the proposition that there is a limited
number of political cultures and describes a typology with four cultures. Lane (1992)
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believes that this typology is too narrow but observes that political culture does
demonstrate orderly patterns.
The political culture that characterizes a community is the pattern of “political
attitudes and behavior of individuals and groups” (Almond & Verba, 1963/1989, pp. 3031) that is observed there. Some authors have chosen to use the term civic culture to refer
to local political culture so as to distinguish it from national political culture. While this
follows the language of Almond and Verba, their use of the term was normative in
character or at least descriptive of political culture in which the individual was not merely
a subject of political institutions but acted as a participant in the political process.
The characteristics of political culture that make it civic have been summarized by
Rice and Sumberg (1997) and Rice and Arnett (2001), who have followed Putnam (1993)
in organizing these characteristics into four categories. The first of these is civic
engagement, citizens’ concern for the common good. Second, there is evidence of
egalitarianism on the part of citizens so that others are treated as political equals with
similar rights and responsibilities in society. Third, citizens demonstrate trust of and
tolerance toward their fellow citizens. Finally, voluntary associations play a significant
role, creating the means for cooperation among citizens.
In distinguishing between political culture and civic culture, Reese and Rosenfeld
(2002) describe the latter as “both a broader and more focused concept” (p. 41) than the
former. Its breadth is characterized by its incorporating “patterns of understanding and
community behavior” (p. 41). Civic culture’s focus, however, “relates specifically to
local rather than national political arenas; refers more specifically to the life of a
community and, thus, denotes the patters or way of life in a local community” (p. 41)
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Reese and Rosenfeld (2002) noted that local political, or civic, culture:
Serves as a penumbra, its attributes and components defining what issues are
problems, what solutions are possible, how decisions are made, and who is
involved in decision making. Local civic cultures embody shared visions—past
present and future—and are the essence of the local community. Civic culture
shapes everything from governmental institutions to governing regimes and to the
policies employed. (p. 18)
Civic culture is a part of what Zjiderveld (1998) refers to as the “symbolic
infrastructure of the city” (p.20). He identifies it and economic culture as central
components of urbanity or urban culture. His use of the term culture encompasses the
traditional concepts of meanings, values and norms, “the totality of the ways of thinking,
feeling and acting of the members of a group” (p. 22), and the members’ “shared sense of
identity” (p. 23).
In their study of local economic development, Reese and Rosenfeld (2002) adopt
the four components of urban civic culture proposed by Banfield and Wilson (1963):
1. The appropriate forms of civic action: the strategies or avenues through which
aspirations and activities can be accomplished . . .
2. Expectations about the likelihood of change, the set of problems and solutions
deemed to be acceptable for the political agenda.
3. Appropriate tactics for emerging interest groups: how new groups learn from
established interests to gain access to the system . . .
4. The balance between the internal forces of conflict and community: the
balance between “complementary” interests and shared identity and the
conflict that occurs as the natural result of different demands among groups
and interests. (pp. 59-60)
Lane (1992) reviews the use of political culture both in terms of the definition and
usage of the phrase as well as at the methodological level. She concludes that “a major
difficulty in achieving a clear overview of the field of political culture has been the
fundamental failure to settle on an operational definition of the internal structure of
political culture, that is, of the variables of which it is composed” (p. 363). She proposes
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incorporating formal models of political culture into models of decision-making and
suggests that such an approach could address what she perceives as the “conceptual
weakness (indeed failure) of rational-choice theory” (p. 364). She writes:
From this perspective, then, political culture would refer not to a single
classificatory scheme (traditional, civic, etc.) but to an approach or method
analyzing, for a given group, its basic beliefs, in order to develop a model of those
beliefs and their interrelations. A political culture model would be defined as a
complex structure of logically linked belief variables, shared by most of a group’s
members, about what motivates people; . . . who should get what, when, and how;
what roles each person is allowed or forced to assume; and how, overall the group
is to be organized. (pp. 354-355)
Organizational Culture
Hendry (1999) suggests that organizational culture cannot be separated from
societal culture generally. His argument is based on the influence of competing
organizational norms on the form that organizations take to accomplish work. He sees
two competing value systems–markets and hierarchies–between which organizations
choose as to the manner in which they structure themselves. He notes, however, that
changes in society generally are bringing forth advocates for a third form: the network
organization. While he does not see networks as a novel form, likening them to classic
market organizations, he observes that organizations are considering hybrids of market
and hierarchical organizations as a means of addressing contemporary challenges.
Focusing more on the internal activities of organizations rather than on the
manner in which they are structured, Handy (1993) classifies organizational culture into
four types. The defining characteristic of the power culture is the central source of power
or authority in the organization. The role culture “is often stereotyped as bureaucracy” (p.
185), “works by logic and rationality” (p. 185), and emphasizes the use of rules and
procedures. The task culture has a job or project orientation and is “appropriate where
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flexibility and sensitivity to the market or environment are important” (p. 188). The
fourth form, the person culture, is rare. This organization exists for the benefit of the
members of the organization itself.
Both conceptions of culture in organizations suggest that there are norms and
beliefs characteristic of organizations that influence the manner in which these
organizations relate to their environment. Of interest, then, is the manner in which these
norms and beliefs influence actors’ interactions with representatives of other
organizations engaged in similar work.
Professional Culture
Finally, professional, or occupational, culture is seen as influential in decisionmaking generally (Schein, 2004; 1996a; 1996b) and with regard to economic
development in particular (Feiock et al., 2003; Rubin, 1988/1999). Schein (2004) states,
“If an occupation involves an intense period of education and apprenticeship, there will
certainly be a shared learning of attitudes, norms, and values that eventually will become
taken-for-granted assumptions for members of those occupations” (p. 20).
“Professions and organizations are alternative ways of institutionalizing values . .
. and expertise” (Bell, 1985, p. 21). Bell notes the potential for conflicts between the duty
of a professional to his or her employing organizations and the allegiance to the
profession itself. This is particularly significant when those professionals have policy
roles. “Insofar as organizations combine technical policymaking functions in the same
officials, organizations strengthen the authority of professional values in the process of
acquiring technical expertise” (p. 22).
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Wilson (1989) found that professional norms were influential in policy
implementation. In his analysis of decision-making in the Federal Trade Commission
Office of Evaluation, he noted that neither the laws governing the Commission’s
enforcement activities nor agencies policies provided much guidance as to which case
should be pursued. “What does tell the employees of the FTC what to do is, to a
significant degree, the professional norms that they have learned and the career
opportunities those professions hold out to them” (p. 59). He defines as professionals
those members of occupational groups that, in addition to the specialized training that
they receive and their groups’ promulgation of a code of conduct, demonstrate through
their behavior allegiance to that occupational group. “In a bureaucracy, professionals are
those employees who receive some significant portion of their incentives from organized
groups of fellow practitioners located outside the agency” (p. 60).
Schein (1996a, 1996b) has identified three cultures of management within
organizations. The operator culture comprises line managers and workers concerned with
the production work of the organization. The engineering culture includes those with
specialized training and experience whose primary focus is on technology and related
issues. The third culture is that of the executives, the CEOs and those immediately below
them in the hierarchy. Their primary area of interest is those issues that relate to the
survival of the organization.
In his case study of networks of agencies involved in environmental protection in
California, Thomas (2003) found a somewhat similar breakdown in cultural types. He
observed that “for public officials, cooperation is a practical and rational solution to
certain kinds of problems, but to understand why it is rational we must first understand
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how they interpret the world” (p. 3). He found that the cultural influences of community,
organization, and profession varied depending upon the actors’ occupations. Line
managers valued autonomy for the stability that it afforded their agencies. Professionals
“split their loyalty between agency and profession” (p. 27). Field staff tended to identify
more with the communities in which they were located the longer they lived in them.
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CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

Multiple Case Study Design

Determining the applicability of the model developed in Chapter 1 to actual
practice and accounting for variances from the model required an exploration of decisionmaking in interorganizational networks. Multiple case studies of economic development
coordination in several Michigan cities were undertaken for the purpose of comparing
actual practice to the theoretical model.
The case study methodology is found within the qualitative research tradition.
Creswell (1998) defines qualitative research as follows:
Qualitative research is an inquiry process of understanding based on distinct
methodological traditions of inquiry that explore a social or human problem. The
researcher builds a complex, holistic picture, analyzes words, reports detailed
views of informants, and conducts the study in a natural setting. (p. 15)
The nature of the research question, the desire to explore a topic, and the need for
a detailed perspective of the subject of interest are among the reasons that Creswell
(1998) offers for the use of qualitative research. He defines a case study as “an
exploration of a ‘bounded system’ or a case (or multiple cases) over time through
detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information rich in
context” (p. 61). Creswell contrasts ethnography and case study by noting that the former
focuses on a cultural system and the latter on a system that is “bounded by time and
place” (p. 61). Yin (2003) distinguishes between case studies and ethnography or
grounded theory on the basis of the place of theory development. The design of case
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study research forces the researcher to engage in preliminary theory development that is
avoided in the other two methodologies. Yin writes, “For case studies, theory
development as part of the design phase is essential, whether the ensuing case study’s
purpose is to develop or test theory” (p. 28).
A case study, according to Yin (2003), is an empirical inquiry that “investigates a
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (p. 13). The phenomenon of
interest with regard to the proposed research is interdependent decision-making and the
context is interorganizational policy implementation networks. As was noted above, the
model suggests the manner in which the decision to cooperate in a network setting differs
from decision-making appropriate to markets or hierarchies. The case study, then, is an
appropriate methodology for such an inquiry.
Yin (2003) provides a justification for using the case study methodology for
research of the type that is the subject of this paper: “In general, case studies are the
preferred strategy when ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are being posed, when the investigator
has little control over events, and when the focus in on a contemporary phenomenon
within some real-life context” (p. 1). He notes that the case study “is used in many
situations to contribute to our knowledge of individual, group, organizational, social,
political, and related phenomena” (p. 1).
It might be argued that other research strategies, such as an experiment or a
survey, might have been equally applicable to this research. The rationale for using the
case study is based on the need to understand the process of decision-making on the part
of multiple actors within the same bounded system. In testing the theoretical model of
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interdependent decision-making, there was a need to examine decision-making within the
specific context of interactions involving particular actors and organizations. The case
study methodology is justified based on the inability to assure that appropriate contextual
information can be obtained through any other method.
Yin (2003) addresses concerns regarding generalization from case studies, an
issue of relevance given the small number of cases proposed for inclusion in this research
and the narrow field of local economic development from which those cases are drawn.
Yin distinguishes between analytical generalization and statistical generalization and
notes that “case studies . . . are generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to
populations or universes” (p. 10). Because the purpose of the case studies was to test and
refine a model of interdependent decision-making, the case study was appropriate with
regard to this approach to generalization.
Case studies can be based on single-case or multiple-case designs (Yin, 2003). A
multiple-case design was selected in order to address what Yin terms replication logic,
which he contrasts with sampling logic. Replication logic enables the selection of cases in
an effort to achieve similar results or to achieve different results but within the theoretical
framework of the research. For the proposed research, multiple cases were selected for
the latter purpose in that it was assumed that both decisions to cooperate and to not
cooperate are addressed within the logic of the model.
Case Selection
The cases for study were selected from Michigan home rule cities. The selection
of a single state’s cities is warranted for two reasons. First, such a selection would reduce
the influence of state-to-state differences in the manner in which the economic
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development activities are conducted at the local level and insure comparability in the
range of tools available to cities and other local entities. Second, while there is state
involvement in economic development activities, much of the impetus for the broad
range of such initiatives comes from the local level and is implemented through tools
such as industrial park development, downtown development authorities, tax abatements
and the like.
Home rule cities were selected over other forms of local government in Michigan
for the purpose of establishing a threshold level of governmental organization that should
be associated with the capacity for governmental involvement in economic development.
The exclusion of villages and townships from the population likely eliminated from
consideration units of government with capacity for and involvement in economic
development activities. Many villages are small in population and resources and many
townships are rural and provide minimal levels of governmental services. Their inclusion
in the population from which the sample was drawn would have added needlessly to the
work of identifying suitable case study communities.
Economic Development Activity
Not all home rule cities were suitable for inclusion in the sample from which the
case studies will be drawn. Two issues were of concern. The first was the willingness of
the community to undertake economic development activity. Some bedroom suburbs, for
example, might have little interest in attracting industrial jobs and might lack an
identifiable central business district. Some history of commercial and/or industrial
activity in the city is an important indicator of the possible presence of
interorganizational networks. A proxy for such activity is the amount of commercial and
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industrial tax base in a community. Data regarding the 2003 state equalized valuation for
commercial, industrial, and personal property were obtained from the Michigan State Tax
Commission web site for all 264 home rule cities. These data were used to calculate the
percentage of total state equalized valuation that were represented by combined
commercial, industrial, and personal property. Excluded from the sample were those
cities for which the commercial, industrial, and personal property valuations were more
than one standard deviation above or below the mean for the population.
The exclusion of cities with a small percentage of such valuations has been
addressed above. The decision to exclude cities with a large percentage of commercial,
industrial, and personal property valuation was based on concern for avoiding
communities in which commercial or industrial interests are dominant. Where these
interests predominate, it is reasonable to expect that decision-making on the part of local
officials might not reflect the full range of factors that would be found in other
communities. In other words, the design sought to eliminate those communities that
would reflect a “company town” culture that prevents true choice on the part of local
decision-makers.
Excluding these cities helped to assure that those that were selected for case study
analysis were generally reflective of the majority of communities. The decision to focus
on “average” communities clustered about the mean was made for the same reason as
selecting only a single state’s cities for study. The concept of interest is the way in which
cultural factors serve to create a focal-point effect that determines whether or not there is
an inclination toward cooperation. The inclusion of a larger variety of economic
circumstances within the population from which sample communities are drawn could
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have introduced factors that, while interesting in terms of local decision-making, were not
relevant to the model.
The characteristics of the communities before and after exclusion based on
percentage of state equalized valuation represented by commercial, industrial and
personal property valuations are shown in Table 1.

Table 1.
Characteristics of Populations of Michigan Home Rule Cities Before and After Exclusion
Based on Commercial and Industrial Activity
No.

% Business State Equalized Valuation
Min.

Max.

Mean

Stand. Dev.

Before Exclusion

264

1%

89%

37%

16%

After Exclusion

180

21%

52%

37%

9%

Capacity
The willingness of a community to engage in economic development does not
mean there is a capacity to do so. McGuire, Rubin, Agranoff, and Richards (1994) state
that “nowhere is the issue of insufficient development capacity more prevalent than in
rural and other small communities” (p. 426). Accordingly, population was used as a
proxy for development capacity. Concerns existed on both ends of the population
spectrum. Small communities might lack sufficient capacity for the municipal
government to be involved in economic development activities. Larger cities, on the other
hand, might have such capacity that they are able to dominate all economic development
activities, demonstrating little of the impetus for interorganizational coordination and
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decision-making that is the subject of interest. Accordingly, both the smallest and larges
cities were excluded from the study.
It might be argued that it was inappropriate to exclude smaller cities on the
assumption that their municipal government would lack development capacity. The
community might well demonstrate development capacity in the form of county
government programs and initiatives on the part of the chamber of commerce or a
private, nonprofit development organization that could operate independent of local
government. That is true to a point but it must be recognized that the granting of tax
abatements, the use of tax increment financing, and the establishment of downtown
development authorities all require the involvement of the local governmental unit.
Because of the presence of many small cities and one very large city in the state,
the distribution of cities by population is not normal. The logarithm of population was
used, therefore, for the purpose of excluding cities, with any city whose population was
more than two standard deviations above or below the mean removed.
Unlike the issues discussed above with regard to business investment in an
“average” community, the concern with the development capacity of cities warranted
excluding only those that are true outliers. The availability and use of development
capacity in a community will reflect political and organizational cultural influences that
were of interest in this study. Accordingly, including within the population the potential
for significant variability, while excluding some for the reasons noted above, helped to
assure that those communities selected for study had the potential to reflect these cultural
differences.
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Of the 180 communities resulting from selecting those within one standard
deviation of the mean for business investment, 9 were outliers based on the population
criterion. Not surprisingly, none of these were small communities; those without
sufficient development capacity to generate business investment were eliminated in the
earlier filtering procedure. The population from which study communities was drawn,
then, was 171 communities.
Case Variety
Table 2 shows the classification of these communities by the Census Bureau
following the 2000 census. This classification is based on Bureau definitions that permit
distinguishing among three types of communities: metropolitan; micropolitan and other.
Metropolitan and micropolitan communities differ from others by virtue of their being
located in areas comprised of a county or counties that contain an urbanized area or urban
cluster of at least 10,000 population. To be considered metropolitan the urbanized area
must have a population of at least 50,000 persons. Distinctions are also made between
principal cities and others. Definitions for terms used in this classification system are
found at Appendix B.
Cities were selected at random from each of the groups identified in this matrix.
Such a method does not yield a sample that is representative of the population nor does it
assure that the sample reflects variation in cultural types, particularly with regard to
political culture. This limitation might affect the ability to generalize from the sample to
the population as a whole in terms of the range of potential cultural types. It does not,
however, affect the ability to test and modify the model developed above. The utility of
the model is its characterization of the dynamic nature of cultural influences on the
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decision to cooperate. This aspect of the model is independent of cultural types and can
be expected to operate in roughly the same manner regardless of the particular cultural
types present in any specific community or network setting.

Table 2.
Population Characteristics of Cities by Classification and City Type
No.

Min.

Max.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Metropolitan

Principal

15

11,168

82,111

43,838

23,894

Metropolitan

Other

90

815

86,602

12,460

15,263

Micropolitan

Principal

12

7010

25,946

14,665

5552

Micropolitan

Other

24

875

9131

3425

2274

30

993

8357

3362

2249

Other

Selecting one city from each of the five groups, however, might have limited the
potential for including high-capacity cities in the sample. This was especially problematic
for metropolitan areas. As the descriptive statistics in Table 2 show, population varies
widely across the two groups of metropolitan cities. The risk in using a random selection
method is that only low-population, low-capacity cities would be selected and the model,
then, would fail to account for unique features of high-population, high-capacity
communities.
This limitation was addressed by selecting one city each from the micropolitanprincipal, micropolitan-other and other categories and two cities each from the
metropolitan-principal and metropolitan-other categories. For the metropolitan-principal
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category, one city was selected from the eight cities below the mean for this category and
one from the seven cities above the mean. For the metropolitan-other category, one city
was selected from the 64 cities below the mean and one city from the 26 cities above the
mean.
These seven cities were compared with lists of cities maintained by the Michigan
Economic Development Corporation and the Michigan Chamber of Commerce to
determine the presence of economic development organizations or chambers of
commerce serving the community. Cities without one or the other were replaced by
randomly selecting another city from remaining cities. In the same manner, cities were
replaced when there was an inability to arrange suitable interviews. Table 3 shows the
cities for which data were collected. Names of communities are altered to maintain
confidentiality of interview subjects.

Table 3.
Case Study Cities
Principal

Other

Metropolitan Large

Centralia

Thermopolis

Metropolitan Small

Lakeside

Jamesburg

Micropolitan

Premiere

Westown

Other

Riverton

While the focus in this methodology was on cities, it was not assumed that
selected city governments were active participants in interorganizational networks, as
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Agranoff and McGuire (2003) have found. Rather, cities provide the context or
environment within which various community-based organizations decide whether or not
to coordinate economic development activities. In addition to city governments and their
planning, community development, and economic development departments, it was
expected that Chambers of Commerce, economic development agencies, county
governments, community colleges, and other organizations played roles in some aspects
of economic development.

Data Collection

The data for this research were collected primarily through interviews, a process
described more fully below. Other data were collected to provide information about the
context of economic development in the communities selected for study.
Documents
Data were obtained from documents produced during the preceding five years
such as newspaper articles, brochures, annual reports and the like. These documents were
obtained from or reviewed at local libraries and the offices of local government, the
downtown development authority, the chamber of commerce, and other organizations
involved in economic development activities in the community.
The initial review of these documents focused on obtaining general impressions
about the conduct of economic development in each community. A further examination
of the documents was undertaken to highlight cultural characteristics of the communities
and organizations involved, particularly with regard to cooperation or the lack thereof.
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Interviewing
The principal data for these case studies were collected via interviews conducted
with individuals in the selected cities who are involved in economic development
activities. These individuals were identified by contacting key persons in city
government, the chamber of commerce, and other recognized organizations. In general,
these individuals were involved in chamber of commerce work and economic or
community development. No individuals from organizations involved exclusively in
tourism or workforce development were interviewed. In addition, efforts were made
during interviews to identify one or more key informants, individuals who were
knowledgeable observers of the economic development scene in each community but
who were not current participants.
Rubin and Rubin (1995) draw a distinction between cultural interviews and
topical interviews. The former are concerned with the “norms, values, understandings,
and taken-for-granted rules of behavior of a group or a society” (p. 28). In contrast,
topical interviews focus on “a particular event or process, and are concerned with what
happened, when, and why” (p. 28). The nature of this research did not readily permit the
selection of one approach over the other. On the one hand, cultural elements, and their
contribution to the focal-point effect, are important to an understanding of how network
participants choose whether or not to cooperate with one another. On the other hand, the
process of forming such relationships takes place within the context of particular
economic development events, an understanding of which might be important to
characterizing the rationale behind the choice of whether or not to cooperate.
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As important as comprehending particular events or processes is, it is the cultural
foundations of the behaviors that are involved in those events or processes that is of
particular interest. Rubin and Rubin (1995) note that culture “is about making choices
and being constrained not to make other choices according to underlying norms and
expectations” (p. 170). Cultural studies “ask how norms and values affect particular
behaviors of concern to others” (p. 173). Testing the model of interdependent decisionmaking developed above required explaining the role of cultural attributes in influencing
the choices that individuals make in network settings.
The significance of distinguishing between these cultural interviews and topical
interviews lies in the approach that is taken in interviewing network participants. In the
topical interview, “the researcher is generally looking for detailed factual information”
(Rubin & Rubin, 1995, p. 29) and “plays a more active role in directing the questioning
and in keeping the conversation on a specific topic” (p. 29). For cultural interviews,
however, the researcher elicits stories and narratives from which can be inferred norms
and values applicable in the particular setting. The interview process was designed to
accomplish principally the latter objective. A total of twenty-seven interviews were
conducted between September 2006 and April 2007.
Interviews followed a protocol—included as Appendix C for key informants and
Appendix D for participant actors—that included a number of standard, open-ended
questions intended to elicit information about decision-making on the part of key actors
and the cultural influences that affected the behaviors and actions of these actors.
Interview questions were designed so as to ask explicitly about norms, values, beliefs,
and expectations as well as to learn this same information through examples and stories.
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With regard to the latter, interview participants were requested to offer stories of success
and failure and to explain why these were considered to be successes or failures. Followup questions were used throughout the interview process to gain as complete an
understanding as possible of how various cultural factors were influential in the economic
development process.
Interviews were conducted with between two and five individuals in each
community. Gaining an understanding of the factors influencing the choice of whether or
not to cooperate with one another was dependent on a frank and open discussion on the
part of interviewees. To facilitate such a discussion, interviewees were assured of the
confidentiality of the interviews, that the names of interviewees and their communities
would not be used in the dissertation, and that other information would be presented in
such a way as to prevent identification of comments with particular individuals or
communities.
With the permission of interviewees, the interviews were tape-recorded.
Interviews were transcribed and coded using qualitative data analysis software. Key
terms used in coding were those related to cooperation, conflict, payoffs, culture,
expectations and the like. Of particular importance were those terms that indicate cultural
norms, values, beliefs, and expectations.
Focusing on norms, values, beliefs, and expectations is not an arbitrary choice. As
was noted in Chapter 2, there is no single definition of culture that is used by researchers
and, perhaps as a consequence, there is no agreed upon list of cultural elements. By way
of example, and with no intent to imply a comprehensive or exhaustive survey, these lists
can include norms (Handy, 1993;Rubin & Rubin, 1995; Schein, 2004), values (Kroeber
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& Kluckhohn, 1952; Schein, 2004), beliefs (Handy, 1993; Rubin & Rubin, 1995),
expectations (Rubin & Rubin, 1995), ideas (Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952), rules (Rubin
& Rubin, 1995), assumptions (Schein, 1996b; 2004), artifacts (Kroeber & Kluckhohn,
1952; Schein, 2004), and rituals (Schein, 2004). When reference is made to these
elements, there is often no definition given.
The choice to focus on certain elements requires the exclusion of others. The
design of the research did not seek information specifically about artifacts, rules, or
rituals. While on occasion interview subjects were asked, or volunteered information
about, ideas (for example., the meaning of community or economic development), this
was not the primary focus of the interviews. Instead, information was sought about those
cultural elements that were believed to be influential in the choice of cooperative or
noncooperative behavior. These were norms, values, beliefs, and expectations. So as not
to repeat the practice of other scholars, the following meanings are given: Norms are
customary and accepted way of doing things; values are those things that are held to be
good and the converse; beliefs are those things that are held to be true and the converse;
and expectations are circumstances in which specific actions are assumed to occur.
The interviews were structured to seek an understanding of the cultural context
for economic development decision-makers by exploring three cultural realms that were
believed to be significant: the political, the organizational, and the professional. In
probing for information about political culture, the desire was to seek a description of the
forces within the community that influenced the work of economic development. The
expectations of citizens, elected officials, and key stakeholder groups were of particular
significance. It was believed that organizational culture would similarly influence
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economic development activities for interviewees by establishing goals and limitations
that would represent boundaries within which the individual worked. Finally, the norms
and beliefs associated with the professional group to which the interview subject
belonged (i.e., community developer, city manager, chamber of commerce director, etc.)
were investigated to learn how educational background and affiliation with peers affected
the way in which he or she performed his or her job.

Data Interpretation

Interpretation of the data was approached in two ways. First, data from across all
interviews were analyzed to gain an understanding of the role that cultural elements play
in influencing cooperation or conflict in network settings. Second, the same data were
examined on a community-by-community basis to examine how cooperation and conflict
were addressed within the context of particular events and settings in these places. The
primary focus of this portion of the analysis was on how culture and culture change
influence actors’ behaviors and actions.
The data were interpreted in light of the proposed model. Of particular interest
was the impact of cultural elements in focusing actors’ attention on cooperation and, in
those instances in which cooperation is not evident, how culture influences resistance to,
or impedes movement toward, cooperation.
Using language from game theory, the model tested through this research has
equilibria for both cooperation and non-cooperation. The question of concern was how in
a given situation or context actors come to focus on one or the other of these equilibria. It
was conceivable that in certain of the situations that were explored, one of the actors is a
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focal arbitrator (Myerson, 1991) whose suggestion in favor of cooperation is sufficient to
cause other actors to adopt that option. The data, then, might be expected to explain why
that individual performs that role in a particular context.
In addition to the role of a focal arbitrator, however, there is the entire cultural
context within which a given actor finds himself or herself. The choice of the case study
method of research provides the opportunity to explore and elaborate this context within
given decision situations as a means of identifying how culture influences the decision to
cooperation. The data, then, were examined for the purpose of providing insights that
inform the model. The primary focus in analyzing these data was to identify those norms,
values, beliefs, and expectations that influence actors’ choices as to whether or not to
cooperate with other actors.
Since the proposed model of interdependent decision-making is one in which
culture acts as a focal-point effect, exploring how it works in this regard was intended to
enhance the utility of the model for those interested in its application to policy
implementation. As Myerson (1991) notes:
The focal-point effect defines both an essential limit on the ability of
mathematical game theory to predict people’s behavior in real conflict situations
and an important agenda for research in social psychology and cultural
anthropology. It should not be surprising that game theory cannot provide a
complete theory of human behavior without complementary theories from other
disciplines. (pp. 113-114)
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CHAPTER 4

FINDINGS

Community Profiles

Westown
Located in the Upper Peninsula near Michigan’s border with Wisconsin,
Westown is home to fewer than 3,000 people in a county of 27,000. It features a main
street business district a few blocks in length. Other commercial development has
occurred on the outskirts of the city along the state highway. There are some small
industries in the community but the majority of residents commute to larger cities nearby
for employment.
Westown’s city manager is the primary actor involved in economic development
activity in the community. He also serves as the director of the city’s downtown
development authority. His efforts are supplemented by those of the director of a countywide economic development organization.
The current structure of the economic development organization was established
in 1999 or 2000. Prior to that time, industrial development, tourism, and chamber of
commerce activities were each managed by a separate administrator reporting to distinct
boards of directors. Following the departure of two of those administrators, operations
were consolidated under a single head. Local governments pay the largest amounts of
dues to the organization and their representatives serve on the board of directors.
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Industrial development marketing assistance is provided to Westown through the
economic development organization’s affiliation with the Upper Peninsula Economic
Development Alliance, a voluntary association of economic development organizations
that contribute funds for promotion and attraction purposes.
The area has shown a stable economic environment since the cessation of mining
activities in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The primary economic development efforts in
Westown are dedicated to reinforcing its identity as an attractive residential community
with good schools and an attractive central business district. This is in part a reflection of
the costs associated with developing infrastructure for industrial development, the
sentiment of community residents in favor of such an approach, and an acknowledgement
that, with its electric and cable television utilities to supplement the more traditional
water and sewer, the city is less dependent upon tax revenues from industrial
development.
Premiere
Owing to its historically strategic location in the eastern Upper Peninsula,
Premiere is among Michigan’s oldest communities. Its economy reflects a mix of
commercial and industrial employment for the city’s 14,000 residents, but economic
stability traditionally has been dependent upon government jobs. Those lost to a military
base closure in the 1980s have been recovered partially through the building of state
prisons and, more recently, due to homeland security needs.
A combination of economic development tactics is employed by various public
and nonprofit organizations in Premiere. The city’s efforts are divided between the
economic development corporation, which is focused primarily on industrial
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development, and the downtown development authority. The county-wide chamber of
commerce has 400 members and is in the process of redefining its mission in the
community. Other active organizations with somewhat narrower agendas include a
convention and visitors bureau, a state university, and an Indian tribe. A recent conflict
between the economic development corporation and the downtown development
authority spurred the formation of a task force to develop a more coherent economic
development strategy. Task force membership has been expanded to include the chamber
of commerce and tribal representatives. In addition, the chamber of commerce director
and others have been promoting the enterprise and entrepreneurship ideas of Dr. Ernesto
Sirolli.
Riverton
Riverton, with a population a little above 5,000, is one of the small communities
in the northern Lower Peninsula whose economies depend primarily upon tourism. Its
location provides access to the Great Lakes, and one of the keystone projects growing out
of a recent downtown planning effort was the development of marina facilities. Other
efforts are focused on creating a quaint central business district environment comparable
to that of more well-known communities in the region such as Petoskey and Harbor
Springs.
The community is not content to rely solely on tourism, however, as a source of
employment for its residents. Some industrial jobs have been recovered following the
closure of a plant affiliated with a major corporation. During the time that interviews
were being conducted in the community, efforts were being made to finalize an affiliation
with a multi-county economic development organization that had developed a reputation

85
for success in facilitating the development of economic base jobs in the region. This
affiliation was made possible by a change in leadership at the county level, with the
election of two pro-development commissioners and the employment of a new county
administrator. A reinvigorated county economic development corporation is chaired by
the Riverton city manager. This affiliation was also strongly supported by the director of
the Riverton chamber of commerce.
The decision to join with the multi-county economic development organization
also means the duplication of some of the services provided by a regional planning
organization that serves the same area.
The chamber’s primary economic development role reflects the tourism base of
the local economy and involves managing festivals and community events. The Riverton
city manager also serves as downtown development authority director.
Lakeside
Unlike the other six communities included in this research, Lakeside and its
surrounding area have avoided most of the decline in manufacturing employment that has
characterized Michigan in recent years. Although it continues to be perceived as a
residential suburb of the neighboring community with which it shares core community
status in the metropolitan statistical area, in fact it has seen significant industrial and
commercial employment growth. A former township that was incorporated as a city in
1968, its available land resources have benefited the area by providing industrial park
space to accommodate the growth needs of the region. In addition, its location adjacent to
the intersection of two interstate highways has encouraged growth along a commercial
corridor that has become home to shopping malls, restaurants, and “big box” retailers.
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Despite this growth, Lakeside remains a preferred location for housing in the area. Its
2000 Census population was more than 22,000 and the city manager believes additional
growth has occurred since then.
Local officials see continued commercial and industrial growth as essential to the
future of city government. The city’s low millage rate is a remnant of its township
origins, and state funding cutbacks are presenting challenges for the city in providing
accustomed levels of local services. Residents have defeated ballot initiatives designed to
raise that rate and some resistance to granting certain business tax abatements has
become evident.
Despite its unilateral success, city leadership has adopted a regional perspective
on issues of economic development. A former mayor was instrumental in adding
Lakeside’s support to efforts to restructure county-wide development organizations so as
to split chamber of commerce and industrial development functions into two distinct
organizations. Lakeside contributes financially to the economic development
organization. A major initiative of this organization is the redevelopment of the
downtown area of the neighboring core community.
The city’s economic development efforts are a function of the community
development department. In addition to traditional plan review functions, that department
has responsibility for development of industrial park space. As a consequence of the
reputation that Lakeside has developed, many developer contacts are made directly with
the city rather than through the economic development organization.
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Thermopolis
Thermopolis is located in southeast Michigan and is among the oldest cities in the
state. It accommodates the needs of its 22,000 residents on four square miles of land,
making it among the most densely populated of the state’s cities. Accordingly, it has little
land available for new development. Many of its residents have depended upon
employment in the automotive industry. A major state university is located within the city
limits.
Much of the city’s economic development activity is focused on its downtown
commercial areas. It is unique in having established two downtown development
authorities. These organizations have collaborated in the hiring of a single director. One
of the DDAs is organized around the traditional central business district. The second is
focused on an older historical area. The latter has been the more successful of the two in
terms of attracting both new investment and visitors, and this has resulted in the
expression of some jealousy from business owners in the traditional downtown.
Because it is built out, city economic development efforts are oriented for the
most part toward redevelopment. A major reuse project on the periphery of the traditional
downtown has been underway for several years. The city assembled a number of parcels
of land and has worked with two separate developers, both of which withdrew from the
project before work commenced. The more recent of the two proposals was for a mixeduse development that would have included condominium housing, office and commercial
uses.
County communities and organizations have ceded control over industrial
development efforts to a relatively new economic development organization that recently
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merged with a similar organization also serving the county. This new organization has
been aggressive in marketing the region, branding it with the name of the best known of
the county’s cities. This decision created some discord from other cities and did nothing
to reduce the rivalry between Thermopolis and this city.
A distinctive feature of Thermopolis is the awareness on the part of city officials
of the role that grass roots volunteerism plays in community life, including its economic
life.
Centralia
The largest of the study cities with a population of nearly 80,000, Centralia has
developed a structure for economic development that reflects both specialization and a
complex mixture of public and nonprofit organizations. Those activities that fall under
the greatest city control tend to be focused on neighborhood enterprise development and
brownfield redevelopment. In addition, it provides tools that are used by other
development organizations working in the city. The downtown development authority is
used primarily for the functions it is permitted to exercise under the state enabling statute.
Its operations have been melded into an umbrella organization, organized as a private,
nonprofit corporation, that also includes arms devoted to land assembly and parking
system management. Industrial attraction efforts for the county are the responsibility of
another private, nonprofit entity that receives almost no public funds for its operations.
Other organizations active in various aspects of economic development include the
chamber of commerce, the local university and community college, neighborhood
associations, and a community foundation.
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The structure established for economic development reflects a couple of
competing community interests. While public officials express the need for transparency
in their operations, the nature of economic development work mitigates against
publicizing activities in this arena. Perhaps owing to its perceived success, the public has
acquiesced to the desires of the economic development organization for secrecy in its
operations.
Having an active and aggressive independent economic development organization
has permitted the public entities to pursue a strategy that is more clearly focused on
community development. More precisely, their efforts have been directed toward projects
intended to create a more attractive environment, particularly in the downtown, while
also addressing challenges in some of the city’s needier neighborhoods.
The current structure for downtown development has been in place for many
years, although it is not without its critics. By contrast, the area-wide economic
development organization was formed only seven or eight years ago after a long history
of failed attempts.
Jamesburg
Of the seven cities included in this study, Jamesburg is the one that has seen the
most dramatic of economic reversals. A factory that had employed thousands of local
residents closed in the mid-1980s, spurring an exodus of residents that resulted in a
population decline of nearly 50% to its current 5,000. This event still influences
community perspectives regarding economic development.
The Jamesburg city manager is the individual primarily responsible for economic
development activity in the community. The city has contracted with the chamber of
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commerce to administer its downtown development authority. Accordingly, these two
organizations operate in tandem in promoting business interests, although the chamber
perceives a somewhat broader interest in promoting the entire community. The boards of
these organizations recently held their first joint meeting to insure effective coordination
of activities.
Jamesburg is assisted in its economic development efforts by a regional economic
development organization that is active in industrial attraction and expansion outside of
the urban core of the county. In addition, the county community development department
supplements and supports the efforts on the part of Jamesburg officials.

Community Type

The design of the multiple case study approach was intended to provide variety in
types of cities so as to attempt to obtain data that might be as broadly representative of
the range of home rules cities in Michigan as possible. As noted in Chapter 3, cities were
randomly selected according to a classification system so that principal and other cities
from metropolitan, micropolitan and other areas were included for study. While the
population of cities ranges from 3,000 to 80,000, none of the cities would be considered
large. Accordingly, all are dependent upon other organizations for carrying out some
portion of the economic development activities with which they are involved. It is
possible, then, to examine the data for differences according to community type and for
commonalities that exist independent of community type with regard to factors relevant
to the conduct of economic development in a cooperative manner.
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Four of the cities—Centralia, Thermopolis, Lakeside, and Jamesburg—are
metropolitan communities. Jamesburg stands apart from this group in character. It is
found in a small metropolitan area and is far enough from the center of population that it
is more like cities classified as micropolitan-other or other. The other three cities have the
character typically associated with those located within more populous, urbanized regions
but this similarity does not mean that they approach economic development in the same
way. Centralia and Thermopolis are both older communities; redevelopment is a
significant portion of the work that they do. For Centralia, downtown development is of
considerable significance to the community’s identity. The DDA director referred to the
central business district as the downtown for the entire region. For Thermopolis, a builtout community with limited land resources for industrial development, the downtown is a
way of maintaining an identity distinct from the region’s principal city, and that is the
principal focus of economic development work in the community. Lakeside has no
downtown and relies on that of the other principal city in its region to provide that
recognizable urban feature. It is also the community in which local officials expressed
most clearly the interest in a regional perspective to economic and community
development.
Premiere is the largest city in its region and lacks regional partners for economic
development. While the county government operates an economic development
corporation, its focus is on a single property outside the city, and there are few obvious
reasons for the city EDC to collaborate with it. While the city manager indicates that
organizations will work together on projects for which there is a definite goal in mind, it
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appears that in general there has been a lack of cooperation among community
organizations, a situation that appears to be undergoing change.
The remaining three communities—Jamesburg, Riverton, and Westown—are the
smallest of those studied and would seem to have the most to gain from collaboration.
The primary economic development actor in each is the city manager. Reflecting the
challenge of economic development capacity in smaller communities, all three city
managers indicated that the responsibility for the range of management tasks made it
difficult to devote adequate time to economic development work. The responses to these
challenges have been varied, however. The Westown city manager has been a supporter
of regional efforts—“I like the regional approach myself” (Personal interview, October
26, 2006)—but devotes most of his attention to residential development and downtown
issues. The Riverton city manager has a close working relationship with the chamber of
commerce director and serves on the county economic development corporation board of
directors. In that role he has been a supporter of efforts by the county to join an existing
multi-county economic development organization. He and the chamber executive both
indicated that they are not proactive with regard to economic development, responding to
opportunities as they present themselves. Jamesburg’s city manager sees economic
development as a key part of her job and of great importance to a city still recovering
from a major plant closing twenty years earlier. She is aware of the resources available to
her through an area-wide economic development organization and the county community
development department. Her focus is on economic base jobs and restructuring the local
economy. Downtown development does not appear to be a part of her overall strategy,
leading to some friction with the downtown development authority director.
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Coordination

The common theme among all seven of the communities related to the
opportunity for coordination to improve the effectiveness of economic development
efforts. Not all communities chose the same path, however, to achieve this coordination.
Premiere had a long history of separate city and county economic development
corporations but had only recently hired a downtown development authority director,
eliminating EDC director and city manager involvement in the administration of DDA
affairs. Westown and its neighboring communities chose, for fiscal reasons, to
consolidate chamber, economic development, tourism, and brownfield redevelopment
under a single administrator. Riverton’s city manager serves as chairman of the county
EDC and the city had been receiving economic development services from a regional
planning organization, but he supported the county’s decision to join an area-wide
economic development organization. The area-wide economic development organization
that services Thermopolis merged recently with a county-wide organization performing
other economic development services. Perhaps most radical of all, Centralia abandoned a
broad-based economic development coalition in favor of a privately-funded organization.
An executive with the local community foundation observed, “They wanted their
organization to be small in terms of board of directorship. They wanted to be business
oriented. They didn’t want a bunch of politicians in it. . . . [T]hey didn’t want government
influence in it whatsoever” (Personal interview, April 2, 2007).
Administrators involved in economic development activities utilized informal
methods to coordinate their work as well. The Premiere chamber of commerce director
noted the ease with which she finds opportunities to communicate with other actors in the
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community: “Because we’re a small community I think we’re all in service clubs together
and things like that. We see each other and we can talk about things and really try to
make things work jointly in that regard” (Personal interview, December 1, 2006). The
Centralia economic development director stated, “I usually meet on a monthly basis with
[area-wide economic development organization officials] and just chew over what's
going on” (Personal interview, February 2, 2007) and another actor said of his
relationship with the director of an area-wide economic development organization, “we
try to have lunch at least once or twice a month just to know what’s going on in all the
areas” (Jamesburg’s county community development director, personal interview, April
17, 2007). The director of the Lakeside area chamber of commerce described the
importance of these relationships in heading off problems with city officials:
We build relationships and we have relationships. So people can call me and talk
to me. Even if I get too private sector, if I get too far to this side, I'll be called
back to say, “Hey, we do have some ordinances here, and we still have to abide
by the ordinances.” [Area-wide economic development organization] has monthly
meetings with all the municipalities and I sit in on all of those and then some of
our municipal people are involved in some of the chamber projects. There's pretty
much ongoing communication so we can pick up the phone and talk to each other.
(Personal interview, October 3, 2006)

Research Questions

Culture
The first research question (See Chapter 1.) was concerned with the impact that
cultural influences from the political environment, the employing organization, and
professional affiliations had on actors’ decisions to cooperate in the performance of
economic development activities. Questions posed to interview subjects sought to elicit
an understanding of the norms, values, beliefs, and expectations that represent the
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cultural context within which the economic development actor works. It was proposed
that the actor’s type with regard to cooperation would be influenced by these cultural
attributes as would the actor’s response to focal-point effects. Of particular interest were
those expressions of culture that related to growth and development matters or that would
have an impact on regional approaches to development.
Political Culture
In as much as economic development was characterized as a wicked problem, it
perhaps should be unsurprising that there is little in the way of a coherent expression of
political cultural attributes that are associated with it. Actors typically stated that citizens
either had no specific expectations with regard to economic development or that these
expectations were expressed in such simplistic terms that they were of little importance in
influencing actions taken by the actors. Several of these administrators indicated that
public sentiment toward development could be summed up in one word: jobs. Riverton’s
chamber of commerce director said, “I think people are still waiting for that next big
plant to come in and try and solve everything,” (Personal interview, September 15, 2006).
Similar statements were made in other communities.
Five of the seven study communities are older, established cities with limited
opportunities for new development. In contrast, Lakeside was incorporated comparatively
recently and has seen considerable development over its history. Additional land is
available for development, and there is some tension felt by city officials involved in
development in addressing citizen concerns about the loss of Lakeside’s remaining rural
character while responding to a city commission that remains pro-development. A
significant portion of the land in Westown is likely to remain undeveloped, according to
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the city manager, due to the cost of extending utilities. He believes that Westown
residents want to see job growth while retaining the city’s small town appeal. Often,
perceptions of the city’s economic well-being are expressed in fairly basic ways: “My
community specifically looks more at the empty buildings. If there's an empty
warehouse, [if] there's an empty building, not so much even an empty lot, an empty
storefront, they view that we are going downhill” (Westown city manager, personal
interview, October 26, 2006).
Similarly, other sources of political cultural influences such as elected officials,
interest groups, or the media failed to exert significant influence on actors in the majority
of communities. Exceptions to this were found in Premiere, in which a minority of city
commissioners reflected negative attitudes toward economic development initiatives, and
in Centralia, in which the interest of the media in economic development activities led to
a heightened concern with transparency on the part of government officials in the conduct
of the public business and also in the development of organizational structures that
concealed some aspects of the economic development process. Neighborhood
development groups in Centralia are close, and sometimes skeptical, observers of the
development process, according to the economic development director:
You know, there’s this tug and pull, especially as it goes with economic
development in downtown and the big [developers], because we’ve got very
strong neighborhood groups, very strong. And then they see the dollars and the
incentives that are going to big projects. They know that there is a billionaire out
there that’s pouring some money into the downtown but at the same time getting
some pretty substantial incentives. And so sometimes there is that friction, and
really that is a balance that we have to come up with. (Personal interview,
February 2, 2007)
Citizen attitudes toward development, perhaps because of their failure to express
them in meaningful ways, appeared to exert little influence on the practices of
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administrators. In Lakeside, developers are required to engage in discussions with
residents about negative impacts of their development and work to mitigate these. In
general, however, citizens are seen as ill-informed on the topic of economic development:
The people who are more involved, the people who are involved on a lot of the
boards and the downtown development authority, planning commission, or other
groups, understand that it is a little bit more difficult than wishing for it. Some of
the general population that is out there probably has an unrealistic expectation.
But you don't see it too often. You’re apt to see this is when it's been stirred up a
little bit around election time. (Premiere economic development director, personal
interview, November 30, 2006)
Thermopolis is the exception among the study communities. An engaged citizenry
there, led in part by an active blogging group, has been involved in discussions about
downtown development. Community organizers held a forum on the topic, inviting city
administrators to attend only at the end of the planning process for the meeting. Neither
the DDA director nor the community development director, both of whom are new to
their positions, reflected negatively on the peripheral roles that they played. Both
expressed respect for the efforts of grass roots groups in the city. The DDA director
stated:
Among the community, when I talk to people, they just feel overall, in addition to
the general tension that exists between public bodies and the community at large,
there’s a distrust of what was being done [in downtown development]. They
didn’t feel that they were being informed well enough with what was happening.
They didn’t feel that transparency there. So this process I thought a very good
way to have a third party come in, put on this event, . . . [and] invite local
residents who are concerned and want to see good things happen downtown.
(Personal interview, December 8, 2006)
There were few indications of political cultural attitudes toward regional
approaches to development that would influence a city’s administrators’ willingness to
work with area-wide economic development organizations. Lakeside officials noted the
influence a former mayor had had in the establishment of such an organization and in
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spurring the city’s involvement in regional initiatives. The director of the economic
development organization serving Westown noted differences between elected officials’
and administrators’ attitudes toward regional approaches to development:
It's the elected officials that have the tendency of, “Well, I think that community
has enough. We should be getting more in.” Or, “We want to be the leaders in
economic development. They're getting all the press. We're not getting all the
press.” You don't hear that from staff. (Personal interview, October 27, 2007)
Norms, Values, Beliefs, and Expectations. Several characteristics of the public
life of the community influence actors with regard to their approach to economic
development. Regionalism is one of these issues. Communities may be classified
according to whether or not they have a regional perspective when undertaking this task.
(Beliefs regarding regionalism are also reflected in organizational culture and will be
addressed below.) The leadership in most communities has adopted a regional
perspective through the formation of or affiliation with area-wide economic development
organizations. Premiere is the lone exception.
A second dimension of political culture is the role of the citizenry and its
representatives: i.e., media, interest groups, etc. As noted above, citizen expectations
concerning the local economy are typically expressed in simplistic terms. Thermopolis is
an exception, having an engaged citizenry that monitors government activities and
volunteers to assist in areas that are important to its members. In Centralia, the interest of
news media and neighborhood groups has resulted in an odd contrast in which public
officials espouse transparency but tolerate the development of organizations that conceal
activities. Most communities receive little citizen, interest group, or media attention
regarding their economic development activities.
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A possible third dimension of political culture concerns the appropriateness of
public and nonprofit sector involvement in economic development. No variation is seen
here, no doubt due to the manner in which study communities were selected.
One aspect of political culture evident in some communities was whom residents
perceived as models or rivals. As has been noted, Thermopolis residents express some
jealousy toward a neighboring community that is perceived as being more successful at
promoting itself. Riverton’s downtown was contrasted with those of Petoskey and Harbor
Springs and Premiere’s to that of Traverse City. These sentiments did not appear to
influence significantly the actions of economic development actors, although the
Premiere DDA director made the following observation:
A. Traverse City is referred to a lot. Everyone uses Traverse City as like the gold
gem of the West Coast of Michigan. So a lot of times when we refer to stuff here
in Premiere, [people say], “Well, why are you doing that?” We're like, “Well, we
got that suggestion from Traverse City. This is what Traverse City is doing. So,
we’re going to try it here.”
Q. Before you move off that point, how do people respond to that? Does
that give it . . .
A. It gives it . . . It’s like credence. They'll be like, “Yeah, let's give that a
try.” At the same time I'm very hesitant about doing that because, what makes
Premiere Premiere is its culture . . . I personally don't want to be Traverse City.
(Personal interview, November 30, 2006)
Organizational Culture
Comments concerning organizational culture and organizational expectations
relative to economic development were diverse. Most focused on specific tasks or roles
that actors played in the economic development process, but an executive with the
community foundation in Centralia noted:
You can layer in everything that’s being done in the downtown under the theory
that a strong downtown, a strong core downtown, is key to a strong central city. A
strong central city is key to a strong county. And a strong county is key to a strong
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region. So we kind of follow that path, that outline, that feel for what we do in the
area of economic development. (Personal interview, April 2, 2007)
Governing bodies in Jamesburg and Westown relied upon their appointed
administrators for direction as to the organizations’ involvement in economic
development. The city manager in Riverton felt little pressure from his council to change
a largely reactive approach to development, indicating that its members understood the
other demands of his position. Other actors were able to express a clear sense of mission
for their organizations. The community development director for Jamesburg’s county, for
example, said:
When it comes to direct economic development activities, we focus our efforts
really on two different things: one, direct business services, [i.e.,] retention,
expansion of existing businesses, recruiting of new businesses; and, two, what I
would call physical development projects, [i.e.,] infrastructure projects, assistance
with municipal finance if there’s bond projects that need to be undertaken to help
the community. (Personal interview, April 17, 2007)
The Lakeside area chamber of commerce director expressed a clear business
advocacy role for her organization. Area-wide economic development organizations
generally outlined specific tactics such as business retention and recruitment with which
they are involved. City organizations, on the other hand, tended to view economic
development within the larger context of the mission of their organizations, perceiving it
as an element of the larger community development program with which they are
involved.
It appeared that administrators in most organizations, even if they lacked clear
economic development missions, understood the boundaries within which they worked.
The Centralia economic development director indicated the charge from the city manager
was to “bring the projects to fruition” (personal interview, February 2, 2007), but
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delineated the specific areas within which his organization was expected to work and
how those areas related to the work of other organizations in the community. The
Lakeside community development director said, “A lot of it starts with the city council
and what their expectations are and their reactions to different projects,” and further
noted, “Even though times are tough, we don’t think real economic development is taking
something from across the [city] border and bringing it here. Ultimately the area doesn’t
gain” (personal interview, September 29, 2006).
As is to be expected, area-wide organizations tended to see their work from a
regional perspective—“Regional economic development is the only way to go.”
(Lakeside area chamber of commerce director, personal interview, October 3, 2006)—but
few of the officials associated with other organizations expressed quite as definitive a
view on the subject. On the other hand, there were few complaints about regionalism
from city officials, although the Lakeside city manager noted, “What I'm referring to are
the regional economic development organizations. I think they're helpful but, at the end
of the day, I think we're doing as much for economic development in our own community
as anyone else” (Personal interview, October 10, 2006).
Norms, Values, Beliefs, and Expectations. While community support for regional
approaches to economic development was the norm, some variation in commitment was
shown from the organizations within those communities. As expected, area-wide
organizations espoused this value. City organizations were more mixed. Some city
officials clearly saw the futures of their organizations tied to the health of the regional
economy. Others took a narrower view.
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Another dimension of organizational culture is the role of governing boards. In
several city organizations, governing boards were seen as dependent upon professional
staff for leadership in economic development. Lakeside is a hybrid in which professional
expertise is valued but elected officials provide input on development proposals to guide
staff. In several nonprofit development organizations, board members serve as a proxy
for the community generally and are used to set development policies and legitimate the
actions taken by the organization.
One key area of variation between the norms of organizations involved in
economic development is whether they are process-oriented or project-oriented. The
former would typically include area-wide economic development organizations and
chambers of commerce that establish and maintain a variety of programs and services
related to business retention, marketing and the like. Many administrators associated with
cities, perhaps due to the diversity of tasks they are required to perform, tended to
identify their work in terms of specific project needs to which they would respond.
A related expectation concerned whether actors identified their organizations as
proactive or reactive with regard to economic development activities. The type of
community did not appear to be a factor in whether one or the other behavior was in
evidence.
In all organizations, economic development was valued positively, although there
was evidence of emerging beliefs consistent with this value in favor of a broader
community development approach. In two communities, sustainability was identified as a
new value that was viewed positively.
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Professional Culture
The professional background of most of the economic development actors was in
one of three areas: business, planning and community development, or city management.
There were few indications of the influence of these professions on the attitudes of
administrators toward cooperation or regionalism. When asked, most said that
professional affiliations had little or no impact on the way in which they performed their
jobs. City managers indicated that they believed that economic development knowledge
was a part of the skill set that they were expected to have and the Centralia economic
development director, a former city manager, noted that city councils frequently look for
economic development experience when recruiting a city manager. The Jamesburg city
manager, who is serving for the first time in this role, came from an economic
development background and had communicated a desire to be active in economic
development when she was interviewed for the position.
Nearly all of those holding positions as DDA directors, community development
directors, or directors of area-wide economic development organizations had been
educated in planning and community development. Regardless of the mission of the
organizations for which they worked, these individuals tended to view their jobs as
involving more than economic development. Two of these actors expressed disdain for
colleagues that tended to ignore the larger community development issues involved in
economic development projects. The administrator for the economic development
organization serving the county in which Lakeside is located noted a distinction between
colleagues that understood the larger community development context of the work and
those that approached economic development solely in terms of short-term economic
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gains. The Premiere economic development director said, “From my perspective, master
planning is sort of at the apex. It’s what the future is going to look like for this area.
Economic development is simply one strategic area that’s implementing that plan”
(Personal interview, November 30, 2006). The Centralia DDA director reflected a similar
view when he stated, “I think downtown development is a little bit specialized in terms of
quality of life type of issues. . . . I don’t see our sole purpose as job creation” (Personal
interview, February 2, 2007).
Those with business backgrounds, the majority of whom were serving as chamber
of commerce directors, demonstrated no specific orientation toward economic
development that was attributable to that experience.
Many respondents identified professional affiliations as a source of information
useful in performing their jobs and stated that they sought out opportunities for
networking with colleagues in other communities. The Premiere chamber of commerce
director, who had been in her position eight months at the time of the interview,
described one of the results of professional training she had received shortly after having
started her position:
So it was a great learning experience for me, because I’m talking to other people
who have been in the chamber world for a long time. And our group coalesced so
good. We just got along great. And we were just a tight organization. Before we
even left that weeklong training, we already had a weblog set up and things to
make sure that we could communicate. . . . So there’s that group there that I was
able to really bond with and I’ve used a lot to give me some ideas about how to do
things. (Personal interview, December 1, 2006)
There were no specific indications from the interviews that networking with peers
influenced attitudes toward cooperation or regionalism. Those who were relatively new to
their positions, however, were more likely to note the use of networking as a source of
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information for problem-solving and decision-making. The downtown development
directors in Premiere and Thermopolis commented on the value of a listserve for idea
exchange among peers when addressing unfamiliar issues. The regional planner serving
Riverton said of her contacts with others involved in economic development, “Right now,
I’m looking to them more for guidance and experience” (Personal interview, September
22, 2006). The city manager in Jamesburg stated that she turned to other city managers
when seeking specific information about a subject: “I think probably the greatest resource
is when you’re dealing with your colleagues” (Personal interview, February 1, 2007).
That peer networks are used for contacts with more experienced professionals would
suggest that this is an important source of socialization for those new to their roles which
might be expected to influence, perhaps subtly, attitudes and behaviors toward
cooperation for economic development.
Peer networks remained important for those with more professional experience.
The Lakeside area chamber of commerce executive indicated that she sought information
from colleagues to address emerging issues such as multiculturalism. The Centralia
economic development director noted the value of learning that others are experiencing
the same challenges.
The clearest indication that professional networking tends to foster specific
expectations with regard to the performance of the job was found among those involved
in community development and economic development. The Lakeside community
development director reflected a perspective about economic development collaborations
when he said, “I’m less a regionalist than maybe some of my peers.” (Personal interview,
September 29, 2006) and noted that he differs from professional colleagues by
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developing relationships with those in private companies who actually perform field
work as opposed to CEOs. The director of the economic development organization
serving Lakeside said of him, however, “We’re pretty much on the same wavelength.
[He] and I share the same philosophy so we approach things the same way. . . . So, it’s
real easy for us to work together” (Personal interview, November 10, 2006). The director
of the economic development organization in the Westown area observed, “Normally in
economic development, you don’t see results within a year. It’s a long-term investment.
It’s developing relationships. It’s understanding the community” (Personal interview,
October 27, 2006).
Norms, Values, Beliefs and Expectations. The norm of information sharing with
professional colleagues was noted above. It appears that there is widespread support for
collaboration with other economic development administrators in the local community,
although in Premiere there seems to be a somewhat mixed record of such collaboration.
Cooperation is discussed more fully below, but it is clear that this is viewed positively.
One significant belief in evidence among economic development actors relates to
the client for the work that they perform. While one might expect that those associated
with nonprofit economic development organizations or downtown development
authorities would see their primary stakeholders as businesses, this was not the case. This
comment from the president of the area-wide economic development organization
serving Thermopolis reflects a typical perspective: “I think our primary stakeholders
would be the communities, the citizenry of the communities that we serve” (Personal
interview, March 22, 2007). Actors employed by city governments also spoke of serving
the interests of their communities. In some cases, this was clearly meant to be the
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residents of the city itself, but there were a number of indications that many had a broader
perspective of the work that they do. Premiere’s economic development director said,
“We basically take the attitude that we’re one big labor market so anything new either in
the city or in the county is advantageous to the area” (Personal interview, November 30,
2006). Centralia’s economic development director saw the work that he does as important
to the economic vitality of the state.
The manner in which information sharing, collaboration, and cooperation take
place may all be viewed as falling within a general norm of social networking. This is
examined more fully in the next chapter.
Cooperation
It was expected that an actor’s type with regard to the propensity to cooperate
would be affected by cultural influences and so would show some variation among the
various communities. This was not the case with regard to the relationships among
administrators involved in economic development. The following is typical of the
responses received with regard to cooperation:
Q. When you think about the people that you're involved with in economic
development, specifically in the Riverton area, would you characterize that
relationship as cooperative or competitive?
A. Oh, it's cooperative. Why would it be competitive? (Riverton regional
planner, personal interview, September 22, 2006)
Even in those instances in which there was some conflict with regard to the
conduct of economic development activities, cooperation was clearly the expected
behavior. One administrator described such a conflict:
There was recently a doctor who came to the EDC to purchase some land up by
the airport to build a medical office building. We raised a big concern about that
because we don't want to have our medical sector . . . split all throughout the city.
From a smart planning perspective, we want it to be centralized in all the same
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location. So we got into a little bit of an argument with the EDC about that, which
led us to create this DDA-EDC task force so that all of our future goals and our
plans are on the same table so that everyone knows what we want and what the
EDC wants. (Premiere DDA director, personal interview, November 30, 2006)
One source of conflict affecting regional approaches to economic development
noted in Lakeside, Riverton, and Westown was between the cities and adjacent
townships. The legal structure of local government in Michigan makes annexation
difficult and disagreements can arise when developments occur along borderline streets
or when city utilities are required. The state legislature has responded to this challenge by
passing legislation intended to facilitate cooperation among units of government. Despite
a failure to cooperate in the past over development controls along a commercial corridor
between Lakeside and an adjacent township, agreement was reached on standards for
driveway cuts for new business locations.
A Riverton official described a development opportunity that was lost when city
and township officials were unable to reach agreement under P.A. 425 of 1984, a law that
permits jurisdictional transfers and tax base sharing between jurisdictions for economic
development projects. A reluctance to enter into such agreements, which frequently
provide for the annexation of township land to a city at the end of a specified period of
time up to 50 years, was encountered in the Westown area as well:
Earlier this year I got a request by some businesses to have a seminar on 425
agreements. So I invited [Michigan State University professor] Lynn Harvey to
come up here. . . . We invited all the municipalities. All the cities were excited
about this. They think 425 agreements are the way to go. We invited the major
property owners that owned the major pieces of property to come and hear this. . .
[Township] almost pulled out of the [area-wide economic development
organization] because we had that seminar, because they said, “You know, we’re
opposed to 425 agreements, but you went ahead and had the seminar anyway.”
(Westown area-wide economic development organization director, personal
interview, October 27, 2006)
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The reaction this issue led to discussions by area city managers as to the best
response to the recalcitrance of township officials:
Sometimes they are very cooperative. Other times, they are acting like that big
gorilla. So the 425 issue is a big, big craw for them. And I am actually trying to
work around it with the other managers in the whole group saying, “Look it. Let's
just come up with one common program. That way they're not pairing us off
against you and you and you.” (Westown city manager, personal interview,
October 26, 2006)
While rivalries and jealousy between cities were reported in some cases in
addition to city-township conflicts, these had little apparent effect on the conduct of
economic development activities by the administrators charged with this task. The
director of the area-wide economic development organization serving Lakeside noted,
They sort of have a gentleman and lady's agreement that when we're here at [areawide economic development organization], we're here for the purpose of
economic development. We need to look out for what's best for the whole
community. When we walk out of here, we may argue where that water line is
going or should we really abandon the rail spur or should we do what-have-you.
And they bring those differences into the boardroom, but once again it's more of
an agreement that we have to put those aside sometimes and do what is the greater
purpose. (Personal interview, November 10, 2006)
Reports of conflicts among communities were rare, however, and there were also
few instances of conflicts between economic development actors. In all of the
communities, the coordination of economic development tasks was the most apparent
indication of cooperation. The community development director of the county in which
Jamesburg is located noted that cooperation had improved over the last several years as
organizations involved in economic development had found areas of specialization and
concentrated on excelling at those. Premiere’s economic development director expressed
a similar sentiment. Several individuals, in discussing the formation of the area-wide
economic development organization and chamber of commerce serving Lakeside, noted
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the desire to provide a comprehensive set of business recruitment and retention services
while avoiding conflicts or overlaps.
Focal-Point Effects
The second research question expressed a desire to understand the role that focal
events play in promoting cooperation among economic development actors. As was noted
above, culture, addressed in the preceding section, can be seen as a focal-point effect in
itself. The questions from the interview protocols, however, sought information
concerning events or circumstances affecting the economic well-being of community
residents.
Few communities had experienced recently specific events that focused the
attention of actors on cooperation, although a number cited the loss of a major employer
or the reduction or elimination of employment in a specific sector of the economy. In
nearly all cases, these occurred twenty or more years earlier. There was no indication that
these events had influenced actions with regard to economic development but, in nearly
all cases, these events would have taken place before the actors were involved in
economic development in the community.
The experience of loss of a major employer in the Premiere area in the past
apparently had not completely eliminated the memory of historical conflicts:
A. I think there is a perception of more [infighting] than there actually is. In fact,
one of the things over the years, and in fact I’m probably top of the pile with what
you’re talking about: the [Street] Gang. You’ll hear that term in the community.
Q. I haven’t heard it yet.
A. That’s those of us that have lived and battled over several generations.
They would feel that we’ve sometimes been resistant to new business. And I don’t
think that that really is true. But I do think that the thing that you did pick up on is
that there seems to be more a lack of cooperation to make it really work, for
people to go ahead and get it done no matter what happens. So they’re a little
more careful. “We’ll get it done but we want to make sure we don’t lose anything

111
in the process.” (Former Premiere chamber of commerce director, personal
interview, March 30, 2007)
A somewhat different perspective on the subject of collaboration for economic
development was provided by Premiere’s city manager:
One of the good examples of successful collaboration is the Airbus project where
Airbus was looking for a location in United States, and it had criteria that various
states were allowed to submit up to three locations that met the standards that they
had. . . . It was an excellent exercise for pulling together the resources of the city
and the university and the [Indian tribe] and the county EDC and others and really
kind of very quickly forming together a very comprehensive proposal that
addressed many of the things that this proposal was seeking. I think when you
have something that is very material and very real, it's something that will push
this to the front burner. And when it gets pushed to the front burner, people will
work together to address it. We all have the kinds of issues in the community
where people won't work together. But there's got to be a material goal at the end
of that process. And if there is, people will work together. (Personal interview,
November 30, 2006)
An emerging concern mentioned by officials in the Lakeside and Jamesburg areas
was in the area of human capital and the preparedness of citizens for jobs in the modern
economy. Following the reduction in scientists at a major employer in the Centralia area,
local officials were able to capitalize on earlier investments to encourage entrepreneurs in
the life sciences, an experience later shared with another Michigan city. As the DDA
director noted:
[Company] is probably the finest example of [a negative economic event].
Fortunately for us, it’s been gradual. Unfortunately for [Michigan city suffering
loss of research jobs], it’s a cut, and they’ve been here asking us, “What do we
do?” One of the things from an economic development perspective was viewing
the talent, the intellectual capital that was embodied in those folks, and how do we
tap that and invest in that so the next small start-up can become the next
[company name]. And we spent an awful lot of time doing that and nurturing that
and it’s finally, I think, coming to fruition. (Personal interview, February 2, 2007)
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Payoffs
The subject of the third and final research question was economic rationality. It
reflected a perspective of human motivation in which self-interest plays a significant part.
Accordingly, knowing about rewards economic development actors receive for
performing their jobs was felt to be important to understanding how those payoffs
supported cultural biases for or against cooperation.
The model of interdependent decision-making depends upon the payoffs that
actors receive from their decisions to cooperate with other actors in undertaking
economic development. Even though the model simplifies the determination of this
payoff by eliminating the need to quantify it, it assumes that actors are at least able to
determine whether the results of cooperating were positive, negative, or neutral.
Few comments from interview subjects spoke directly to the issue of
collaboration. Centralia’s economic development director noted a perception on the part
of the employees he supervises that their efforts in collaborative undertakings are not
recognized. “Staff has always complained to me that we carry a lot of the water.
[Regional economic development organization] gets a lot of the laurels.” (Personal
interview, February 2, 2007). The establishment of a farmers market in Jamesburg led to
conflicts between the city and the downtown development authority:
[The city] gave [the DDA] $40,000, which didn’t put us near the $190,000 it was
going to cost to build it. But in this process, it was the DDA who hired a
consultant, a farmers market consultant, to talk with us about the operation of a
farmers market. We did things like select the roof color . . . we created the rules,
etc., etc. So we were doing all this back behind the scenes work on the operation
of the market and the city somehow found money . . . [W]hen [former city
manager] left, I was the only one left who knew what was going on because he
and I had worked so nicely together. And it wasn’t his project or my project. It
was our project. So it was interesting because [the city] built it and everything and
then it was like nobody was doing any of the behind the scenes work. We were
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pretty much told the new city manager said, “This is a city project. We’re paying
for it.” And I said, “OK. Here’s my files and go on.” But nothing was getting
done. They hadn’t formed the board yet for it. We were supposed to have a board.
So this is where some of the contention started because the DDA had spent tons
of time. We had spent meetings, hours and hours and hours and hours, working on
this and then somebody new stepped in and said, “It’s not your project.” Of
course, we got our feathers ruffled quite a bit. (Jamesburg Chamber of
commerce/DDA Director, personal interview, February 1, 2007)
Comments that reflected negative payoffs from collaboration were the exception,
however. It was far more often the case that interview subjects expressed attitudes that
were positive about participation in the economic development process generally. While
some admitted to a direct personal benefit to this work—“Well, right now it’s my bread
and butter . . .” (Jamesburg chamber of commerce/DDA Director, personal interview,
February 1, 2007)—these comments were invariably followed by the identification of
other motives, including undertaking a challenge, being recognized for one’s work in the
community, a sense of accomplishment, and an interest in public service. The following
are representative comments:
I was born and raised in Premiere. This is my home. I think it's a great place to
live. I want to be able to raise my kids here and stay here and I need to be able to
feed my kids and send them to college and all of those types of activities. And I'd
like to be able to have my children have the option to stay here if they choose, and
they need to have decent paying jobs to do that. (Premiere chamber of commerce
Director, personal interview, December 1, 2006)
That's why I enjoy being a DDA director, because every day is something new. I
mean, you have projects that are ongoing and ongoing but someone could call me
today and they have a business that they're looking to move in. I go to work with
them and try to get them established. I meet with an existing property owner over
a code issue that he's dealing with. That's what I like about the job. I'm not stuck
necessarily behind this desk all day. I get out and meet the people. That's kind of
what I enjoy about it. (Premiere DDA Director, personal interview, November 30,
2006)
I guess I can look at a company that’s going to announce that they’re going to
create new employment and say, “OK, we had a part of that. I had a part of that.”
And that’s rewarding. . . . I mean, you hear a lot of hokey phrases: “There’s no
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greater reward than public service.” When I first took this job I kind of thought
that that was all just people talking about how great they were. But after you do it
for a while, it kind of gets under your skin and you actually do believe that. I
mean, I do fundamentally believe that there’s something valuable about public
service. We don’t get paid a lot of money to do what we do, but there is a reward
in it. . . . When I come home and I feel like, whether or not my name gets in the
newspaper, whether or not the county gets in the newspaper about something, if I
know that there’s something in there that happened today that was good, if a
company created jobs or we found new investment opportunities or a community
has figured out a way to solve a water problem or something like that, and we’ve
had a part in it, it’s actually a pretty good feeling. You don’t think about it in
those terms, but it is rewarding. (Jamesburg’s county Community Development
Director, personal interview, April 17, 2007)
Interview subjects also identified benefits to the community that resulted from
their work in economic development such as job creation and population growth. A
number of comments focused on the value to the community of the attention that the
community had received or the enhancement of its reputation:
I think they're [industrial development projects] just, one, great buildings, a
tremendous amount of tax base, a tremendous amount of jobs, and they're just
really symbolic to other communities. I got a call the other day from an attorney.
I was asking her opinion on public art. She said, “I just want to let you guys know
that Lakeside has such a great reputation in the [area city] business community as
a good place to do business. They treat you right. And if you're ever going to
consider doing something, consider doing it in Lakeside.” That's why I consider
them successes. They create a lot of good buzz. (Lakeside economic development
director, personal interview, September 29, 2006)
An analysis of the data obtained from the seven study communities is found in the
following chapter.
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CHAPTER 5

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

The interview data collected for this research offer little support for the proposed
interdependent decision-making model. In this chapter the assumptions upon which the
model was based are examined to determine in which areas the research does or does not
support the model. The chapter concludes with a discussion about coordination,
collaboration, and culture.

Assumptions

1: Economic Development Actors Are Self-Interested
As was noted above, previous research had highlighted the importance of trust in
establishing the cooperation necessary to the operation of interorganizational networks.
Provan and Milward (2001), however, identified self-interest as a more significant factor.
Self-interest lies at the heart of game theoretic models of individual behavior from which
concepts central to the operation of the interdependent decision-making model was
borrowed. These concepts are reflected in particular in that portion of the model in which
actors assess the payoffs likely to result from their choice as to whether or not to
cooperate with other actors.
Basing a model on the assumption of self-interest was believed to be reflective of
an incomplete depiction of individual motivation. Consistent with Lane’s (1992)
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suggestion, the model incorporated both economic rationality and cultural rationality.
Nevertheless, self-interest was central to the operation of the model.
As was noted in the previous chapter, some individuals clearly identified an
interest in tangible rewards such as having a job or getting their contracts extended.
These were often accompanied by statements relating to a sense of accomplishment in the
work that was being done, another possible indication of self-interest. Just as often,
however, comments were made about improving the community or making the city a
better place for one’s family. These observations seem to go beyond pure self-interest and
reflect group and community identifications as well.
In fact, the question, “Why is economic development important for you
personally?” was frequently the most difficult one for interview subjects to answer. It
followed similar questions about the importance of economic development to the
community and to the organization that usually presented no challenge for respondents to
address. Many people gave the impression that they had never thought in any personal
way about why they do the work that they do.
A problem related to the assumption regarding self-interest concerns individuals’
ability to determine whether a payoff is positive, negative, or neutral. If an actor is selfinterested and the benefit to him or her is directly related to the results of cooperating in a
particular instance, then it would be comparatively easy to determine the payoff. This
appears to be true for few actors. Most actors appear to determine the value of
cooperating to accomplish economic development projects based on long-term goals
related to community betterment. A negative payoff might carry proportionately less
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weight than a positive one in such a situation since the focal point is not current
circumstances but some desired future.
In this situation, it might be the case that there are simply few or no negative
payoffs associated with cooperation with other economic development actors. The
challenge from a model standpoint is to separate payoff effects from culture effects. If it
is the case that there are no negative payoffs, then cooperation becomes the norm and is
taken for granted by all participants. Payoffs would become negative for individuals who
act contrary to the norm, a circumstance that was reported only by a chamber of
commerce executive who noted that those who failed to support economic development
initiatives were removed from office.
Combining economic rationality and cultural rationality in the same model, then,
makes it difficult to sort out what is actually operating to influence actors’ decisions. The
model assumed that positive payoffs would reinforce cultural biases for or against
cooperation and that negative ones would promote a change in those cultural biases. The
third research question in particular was framed specifically to pursue this line of inquiry.
Information obtained from interview subjects, as is noted above, failed to support the
assumption underlying this research question that self-interested actors would utilize
payoffs as a means of assessing the personal benefit associated with cooperation.
2: Economic Development Is a Repeated Game
The operation of the model requires that a set of actors have repeated interactions
with one another and make assessments, then, about one another’s types based on the
outcomes of those interactions. The environment for economic development is
sufficiently complex, however, that this requirement might not be met. What one finds is
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that actors see economic development from both “forest” and “trees” perspectives. The
forest of economic development is the community assessment of what programs,
projects, and activities need to take place in order to provide jobs, income, tax base, and
so forth. Communities develop and alter their orientations toward the economic
development forest through a political process that results in coordinating activities
through different configurations of organizations. This aspect of economic development
will be addressed more fully below.
The trees of economic development are the individual projects that make their
way to the community. One example might be a local company that has outgrown its
space and needs to expand. The requirements of any given project will determine which
members of the total population of economic development actors will be involved.
Depending upon the characteristics of a project, they might form together as an ad hoc
task force to better coordinate their activities. In contrast, they might also work relatively
independently of one another on individual parts of the project, interacting only when
required for information exchange.
The majority of the work of economic development is trees. That different
configurations of actors will come together on projects makes for challenges in looking at
this activity as a repeated game. Further, it does not repeat that often. The economic
director in Centralia, the largest community in the sample, manages only a few major
projects in any given year. The area-wide economic development organization director
for the Lakeside area noted that that city’s community development director was so
competent that often projects required little assistance from his organization.
Agranoff (2006) highlights the importance of “sustained collaborative activity”
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(p. 58) to keeping administrators involved with the work of an interorganizational
network. The project-based orientation to economic development might not constitute
sustained collaborative activity. The Premiere city manager spoke about this challenge:
I think all the downsizing that has occurred in all these organizations makes that
cooperation even a little harder now even if there is a desire to do it because
there’s just not a lot of time to spend on the cooperative ventures. I would say
that the only exception to that is when there’s been a big project that’s come
about, and it’s material, and it’s real, then everyone has worked together to push
that thing through. From a more long-term vision standpoint, there’s just not
enough hours in the day for a lot of these organizations to commit time and
resources to a cooperative venture that probably would be good for everybody in
the long run. (Personal interview, November 30, 2006)
The model in general, and the third research question in particular, depended upon
the assumption that economic development actors would be engaged in repeated
interactions in a sustained, comprehensive approach to economic development. In other
words, it was expected that these actors would see economic development from a forest
perspective. Regular, repeated interactions with the same set of actors was felt to
contribute to an individual’s understanding of the payoffs associated with cooperative or
noncooperative behavior with that set of actors.
That is not the case. While these actors do see the forest component of economic
development, much of that perspective appears to be of largely theoretical interest. Those
rare, individual projects are another matter. In such a setting, other actors become a part
of the resource base upon which an administrator may draw to accomplish his or her
portion of that economic development project. Accordingly, the payoffs associated with
cooperating on a project might have little influence on the decision to cooperate on the
next project, since each is viewed as unique. These payoffs do not appear to reinforce
biases regarding cooperation.
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3: Economic Development Is a Wicked Problem
Economic development was selected as a field of study because its complexity
should give rise to interorganizational networks as communities work to divide up
responsibility for the myriad tasks associated with such a difficult undertaking.
Communities do work to divide up responsibilities. All seven of the communities studied
had gone through a process in the preceding seven or eight years whereby organizations
responsible for some economic development task were reconfigured, old organizations
disappeared and new ones replaced them, or new affiliations were entered into.
It appears that communities are responding to the complexity of economic
development by coordinating economic development tasks in increasingly sophisticated
ways. The community development director for the county in which Jamesburg is
situated put it this way:
I think there’s been a lot of competition in the past, you know, a lot of turfism,
you might say, . . . and some competition of who gets primary responsibility in
what field. But I have to say honestly, over the last two years, three years, there
seems to be a lot less of that going on. And I don’t know why that is. . . . It’s not
that anyone consciously says, “Enough is enough. We’re going to start working
together.” It just kind of over time evolved into this where we all kind of accepted
this is our limited role in the overall process of economic development. We’re
going to focus on this and we’re going to do this well. You guys focus on what
you do and do it well and everyone gets along. (Personal interview, April 17,
2007)
It is more common, however, for the study communities to restructure old
organizations or create new ones to address economic development challenges in new
ways. An executive with the community foundation in Centralia noted that there had been
a thirty-year history of failed attempts with county-wide economic development
organizations, each lasting five years or so, before the current organization was
established seven years ago. The Centralia DDA director oversees an organization that is
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a complex mix of public and nonprofit initiatives that arose at a time when a number of
different factors made that particular way of organizing particularly beneficial. He notes,
however, “I don’t know that we would be able to create this organizational structure
today, in today’s environment” (Personal interview, February 2, 2007).
It appears to be far rarer for network structures to be formed to address economic
development complexity. There are a couple of examples that might fit this mold. The
Upper Peninsula Economic Development Alliance, formed by economic development
organizations in the region for marketing purposes, might serve as an example,
particularly since it relies for its administration on the services of economic development
directors from various communities. The area-wide economic development organization
for Thermopolis operates programs that are available to a network of similar
organizations throughout the state. At the community level, though, no evidence was
found for the formation of interorganizational network structures or similar
interorganizational alliances.
This presents a significant challenge to the validity of the model and in answering
the three research questions derived from it. All reflect the expectation that the
complexity of economic development would give rise in at least some of the study cities
to those regular, repeated, formal patterns of interactions that are called networks. In fact,
communities do not feel a need to resort to alternative forms of governance to address
wicked-problem aspects of economic development. It might well be that economic
development activities, while complex, are sufficiently familiar that more traditional
forms of organizing are believed to be adequate.
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4: Interorganizational Networks Are Important
The literature on interorganizational networks in public administration could
easily lead one to conclude that they are essential to managing many complex tasks in the
public sector. Koppenjan and Klijn (2004) provide one example: “Problems cannot be
solved by organizations on their own. Hence, hierarchy as an organization principle has
lost much of its meaning” (p. 3). Only a small chorus of voices (Bogason & Toonen,
1998; McGuire, 2002) has raised questions about this view in the past. More recently,
Agranoff (2006) has written:
[Networks] are not the be-all and end-all of collaborative management. They
share a place—in many cases, a small place—alongside literally thousands of
interagency agreements, grants, contracts, and even informal contacts that involve
issues such as seeking information or some form of program adjustment. (p. 57)
The challenge for scholars is where to position all of this interorganizational
activity on a continuum that is anchored at one end by markets and at the other end by
hierarchies. While networks, as a pure type, fall somewhere in between these two
extremes, they clearly do not occupy the whole of the middle ground. McGuire (2006)
observes that “contrary to what is often put forth in the contemporary network literature,
some collaborative structures actually adopt elements of single, hierarchical
organizations” (p. 33).
If economic development work is not conducted through interorganizational
networks, then there is no need for cooperation to sustain those networks. Agreements,
contracts, and the like have mechanisms much like those employed in hierarchies to
insure that performance obligations are met.
This is not to say that networks are unimportant to economic development in the
study communities, only that interorganizational networks are unimportant. Interpersonal
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networks or social networks appear to be very significant, as comments in the previous
chapter indicate. Many interview subjects reported the importance of relationships and
communication to the work that they do. Further, they frequently noted turning to
networks of professional colleagues as a source of information in addressing challenges
and responding to requests from their colleagues. This was particularly important for
those who were new to their positions.
This complex network of personal and professional relationships is an important
means for economic development actors to carry out this complex task. Cross and Parker
(2004) have written that “employees’ personal networks can also provide an important
lever for improving performance . . . what distinguished high performers were larger and
more diversified personal networks than those of average or low performers” (p. 11).
Chisolm (1989), in his study of transit systems in the San Francisco area, found that
“informal channels based on personal relationships between pairs of individuals are the
most frequent and direct contributors to coordination in Bay Area transit” (p. 69). He
found these informal channels to be self-organizing (Kauffman, 1995; Wysocki, 2000)
and noted the following:
These informal organizational features develop on the basis of need. They derive
from the everyday processes of mutual adjustment that are exhibited by all largescale systems, public and private. Informal channels of communication, informal
bargains and agreements, and norms of reciprocity all contribute directly and
indirectly to processes of coordination. (p. 11)
From the perspective of the model, the participation of economic development
administrators in informal social networks at the local level means that there is
considerably less mystery as to an actor’s type with regard to cooperation. When the need
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arises for individuals to perform some task collaboratively, it is likely that individuals
will be fairly confident as to what they can expect from everyone else involved.
Agranoff (2006) is careful to draw a distinction between interorganizational
networks in public administration and social networks: “Public management networks
are, in every sense, collaborative connections like social networks, although they not only
comprise representatives of disparate organizations but also go beyond analytical modes.
They are real-world public entities” (p. 56).
The significance of distinguishing between interorganizational networks and
interpersonal networks might relate more to the theoretical traditions and analytical
techniques associated with each than to any operational differences. The literature that
explores interorganizational networks from a public administration standpoint stresses the
importance of the formality of the relationships between organizations. Whether or not
that is significant as far as the relationship of actors operating within that network cannot
be said. There were no examples within the study communities to compare to the
informal social networks that were found.
Social networks of economic development professionals might well be the
implementation equivalent of issue networks in the policy arena. Heclo (1978) offers
some observations with regard to the study of issue networks that might be instructive to
those scholars considering the role of interorganizational and social networks in
governance:
Based largely on early studies of agriculture, water, and public works policies, the
iron triangle study is not so much wrong as it is disastrously incomplete. . . . Preoccupied with trying to find the few truly powerful actors, observers tend to
overlook the power and influence that arise out of the configurations through
which leading policy makers move and do business with each other. Looking for
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the closed triangles of control, we tend to miss the fairly open networks of people
that increasingly impinge upon government. (p. 88)
Heclo (1978) continues by contrasting iron triangles and subgovernments with
issue networks:
Issue networks, on the other hand, comprise a large number of participants with
quite variable degrees of mutual commitment or of dependence on others in their
environment; in fact, it is almost impossible to say where a network leaves off and
its environment begins. (p. 102)
It is beyond the scope of this analysis to determine whether the relationship
between interorganizational networks and social networks in public management are
equivalent to the relationship between iron triangles and issue networks in policy studies.
The manner in which economic development takes place in the study cities, however,
resembles that of peer production networks (Benkler, 2006) used to produce open source
software such as the Linux operating system variants or in the maintenance of the online
reference Wikipedia. In these networks, individuals work on small parts of a large
project, each contributing based on his or her expertise and interest. A small group of
individuals might provide leadership in organizing and coordinating the work. At first,
glance, this feature might appear to be missing from the networks of economic
development administrators. It will be argued in the final section of this chapter that the
coordinating process through which communities develop their economic development
infrastructure serves this purpose.
What can be said, however, is that a model of interdependent decision-making
based on interorganizational networks is not applicable to the conduct of economic
development in the seven study communities. As was noted in the preceding section, this
assumption was fundamental to the three research questions, all of which reflected the
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importance of forming and sustaining such networks. While these same questions might
have been phrased so as to assess the impact of culture, focal events, and payoffs on
social networks, this was not done. This choice reflects the bias in the public management
literature, highlighted by Berry et al. (2004), against the inclusion of social network
analysis in research in the field.
5: Other Decision Models Do Not Fit Economic Development
Basing a decision-making model on game theory might well fit into that category
of mistakes that result from being too clever by half. The research in behavioral game
theory has demonstrated that people do not behave as standard models would predict and
most of those observations are from controlled experiments. No other available model
appeared to address the interdependent nature of economic development work.
Each of the three research questions reflects this choice to draw upon game theory
concepts. The first research question sought to understand the role that culture plays in
influencing cooperation. As has been noted, this focus on culture reflects its identification
in the game theory literature as a factor that could influence choosing between
cooperative and noncooperative equilibria. Other events that might constitute focal-point
effects, the subject of the second research question, are also believed to be influential in
this choice of equilibrium. Finally, payoffs, addressed in the third question, are central to
the operation of a decision-making model used by self-interested actors.
There are few indications that administrators engage in the kind of strategic
thinking required for the proposed model. The case cited in the previous chapter of the
Westown city manager attempting to assemble a coalition of colleagues to address
township objections to a tax base sharing agreement is one counter-example. In another
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instance, the Lakeside city manager sought to unify area communities’ handling of tax
abatements for a particular industry, a move that was rejected. These accounts occurred
rarely. It seems that the conduct of economic development tends to be a fairly routine
enterprise that does not require thinking skills necessary in games of strategy.
This does not mean, however, that other conventional models of decision-making
are superior. Gilboa and Schmeidler (2001, 2004) have recently proposed a theory of
case-based decision-making that appears to be a better fit than other theories in
explaining how administrators make choices with regard to managing economic
development. Briefly stated, case-based decision theory holds that an individual will
compare a problem that he or she is facing with his or her memory of other problems
faced in the past. The act that is chosen will be based on the results of choosing acts in
the past adjusted for similarities between the problems. While not addressed by Gilboa
and Schmeidler, it seems reasonable that the choice of acts reflects knowledge of the
decision-making process used to arrive at that choice.
During interviews, those administrators who had served in their positions a long
time or who had a long history of professional experience were able to easily reference
examples from the past to illustrate their stories. It seems likely that they draw upon that
knowledge when facing problems in the present. For new administrators, networks of
professionals served a similar purpose by making available to them a ready supply of
applicable cases already employed in another location.
On the other hand, Koppenjan and Klijn (2004) have utilized games, albeit
qualitative games, to model decision-making in environments characterized by a high
level of uncertainty. Their examples are drawn largely from the policy-making process,
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however, and might not be applicable to managing economic development. The lesson
that might be learned from their research, however, is that game modeling of decisionmaking might be important in areas characterized by uncertainty where strategy plays a
significant role. While economic development is a complex and difficult task, only those
respondents relatively new to their roles appeared uncertain about how best to undertake
the task.
To some extent reliance on a model drawn from game theory presented a
methodological problem. It might have been preferable to use a grounded theory
approach to the research to elicit a better understanding of the manner in which
administrators made decisions in this environment.
6: Focal Points Are All in the Past
Most of the cities studied had experienced some event in the past that was an
important part of the economic history of the community. As noted, in many cases these
occurred decades ago. All of the communities were experiencing the results of the current
Michigan economy. These events did not seem to significantly influence the manner in
which administrators performed their jobs.
In reviewing the comments made by these individuals, many conveyed a sense of
hope for a better future and were working hard to achieve that. The research failed to
consider whether or not there existed a common vision for the community among actors
that would serve to motivate collaborative action.
In addition, responses to questions seeking information about focal events failed
to elicit information about actions on the part of community leaders to coordinate
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economic development activities differently. It might well be that this action serves, at
least in part, as the basis for that common vision.
The second of the research questions was concerned with focal events. Except for
its reference to the influence of focal events on actors in networks, the question itself is
not an inappropriate one. A defect arose when it was operationalized. It was expected that
events in the recent past might have an influence on actors facing decisions about
cooperation. No thought was given to developing questions about a future state of the
local economy that might serve as exactly the focal event spurring cooperation. On the
other hand, this question was not interpreted by respondents in such a manner as to cause
them to mention changes in the manner in which economic development activities are
coordinated. It would be advisable for future researchers exploring this topic to pursue
this subject directly.
7: Economic Development Implementation Was the Issue of Importance
Focusing on the day-to-day actions of administrators involved in economic
development appeared to be a reasonable way to learn how decision-making might be
influenced by culture in a complex environment. All three of the research questions were
framed based on a perspective of a community’s economic development infrastructure as
relatively stable. In brief, it was believed that members of a relatively constant set of
economic development organizations and actors would be influenced by external forces
and events and the culture of groups with which they were associated. Those influences
would affect decisions about cooperating with other members of that set of actors. Those
decisions in turn would have consequences for actors, expressed in the form of payoffs.
These would affect the role that group culture plays in influencing decisions about
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cooperation and the interpretation of focal events. The study communities failed to
cooperate, however, in establishing these stable organizational relationships.
In retrospect, it appears that more might have been learned by examining the
process used by communities to develop the structure through which economic
development activities are coordinated.
As is noted above, all of the seven cities experienced some reconfiguration of the
economic development apparatus in the recent past. Some information about the
motivation for these changes was obtained through follow-up questions, but not nearly
enough to make an assessment of applicable decision-making models. Moreover, political
culture, which appeared from the interviews to be an insignificant influence on actors,
might well have proven of great importance in assessing support for various coordination
alternatives in a given community.
Such a line of inquiry might have demonstrated support for the game approach
employed by Koppenjan and Klijn (2004). On the other hand, Kingdon’s (1995) streams
model appears supported by some of the data obtained. In this variant of the garbage can
model, there are three distinct process streams—problems, policies, and politics—that
occasionally become coupled, opening a policy window that provides an opportunity for
issues to make it to the agenda for action by public bodies.
In both Westown and Jamesburg, reorganizations occurred when administrators
had left their positions. In Riverton, the election of new county commissioners helped
pave the way for affiliation with a multi-county economic development organization. A
set of circumstances in Centralia permitted creation of a complex downtown
organizational structure based on what was known as the Denver partnership. Too little is
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known about these or events in other communities to determine which decision model
would be the best fit. What seems clear, however, is that most of the work of setting the
stage for collaboration takes place at this point, permitting actors then to implement
economic development programs much like they would other government activities.
Why would communities engage in this coordination policy-making? Wilson’s
(1989) work on bureaucracy, while not concerned with networks, might offer a clue. He
proposed a typology of organizations based on whether or not outputs and outcomes can
be observed. Outputs are the activities of the individuals employed by an organization;
outcomes are the results of those activities. The four types of organizations are presented
in Figure 4.

Outputs observed?
Yes

No

Yes

Production

Craft

No

Procedural

Coping

Outcomes Observed?

Figure 4. Types of organizations based on whether outcomes or outputs are observed.
Based on Wilson (1989).

From the discussion of economic development in Chapter 1, it is clear that the
outcomes of economic development—improvement in citizens’ economic well-being—
are not observed. As noted, few efforts are made in most communities to even measure
this outcome. None of the seven cities studied appeared to use measures of outcomes and
only one of the area-wide organizations collected and evaluated such measures. It is
tempting, based on the “forest and trees” discussion above, to conclude that at least some
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effort is made to observe outputs in the form of projects that are completed. This would
enable the community to classify economic development as a function of procedural
organizations. In fact, one community, Centralia, has a formal scorecard method that
specifically measures progress toward completing such projects and it is clear from
discussions with other actors that informal measures of this activity are made as well.
From a community perspective, however, the outputs of its economic
development infrastructure are far harder to observe. The community development
director for the county in which Jamesburg is located noted that only those rare large
projects receive media coverage and public attention. No ribbon cutting takes place for
the small firm that adds one or two new employees each year. From a total community
perspective, the economic development infrastructure functions like a coping
organization. The result of the principal activity of this infrastructure—coordinating the
sharing of information—only is observed readily once in a great while. This will be even
more clearly the case as traditional economic development activities are adjusted to
changing economic realities and communities emphasize quality-of-life considerations as
the primary motivation for economic development activities.
One political response available to community leaders faced with a coping
organization is to change it. Several communities noted that economic development
organizations were becoming more specialized with fewer areas of overlap. The
coordination of these organizations, each with some form of governance oversight, makes
sure that there is clear responsibility for observing the outputs of each piece of that
infrastructure. The mayor in Lakeview need not be concerned about his inability to
observe industrial retention activities so long as he knows that there is an area-wide

133
economic development organization responsible for this function with a board of
directors charged with insuring that it is getting done. Centralia, with its reliance on
opaque nonprofit entities for major portions of its economic development infrastructure,
might appear to offer a counter-example. To the extent that community leadership
accepts this arrangement, however, it serves the same purpose, permitting those leaders to
believe that that infrastructure functions as a collaborative of procedural organizations.

Coordination, Collaboration, and Culture

The central questions that this research was intended to address were those related
to the impact of political, organizational, and professional culture on cooperation. Despite
the lack of support for the proposed interdependent decision-making model, it seems
appropriate to consider what was learned about the influence of culture on economic
development actors’ behavior.
The previous chapter summarized the responses to questions intended to elicit
information about cultural influences. As was reported, political and professional culture
appeared to have little impact on administrators. There was significant variation in
descriptions of organizational culture. This observation raises an important question: If
organizational culture is subject to such variation, how do actors representing different
organizations manage to cooperate?
The answer to this question lies first in considering the environment within which
economic development takes place. As has been noted, economic development is a
complex endeavor poorly understood by the general public. The lack of sophistication on
the part of elected officials with regard to economic development was noted in more than
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one community. The Centralia DDA director said, “I’ve seen a real change in the
complexion. Where you once had businessmen and women on the commission, now you
have nonprofit representatives and homemakers, for lack of a better term. So the business
acumen of the city commissioners changed” (Personal interview, February 2, 2007).
While the same need not necessarily be true of the nonprofit organizations engaged in
economic development activities, those organizations have the opportunity in many cases
to select governing board members committed to the mission of the organization.
It is also worth noting that all seven of the cities studied operated under the
council-manager form of government and most were located in counties that employed a
professional chief administrative officer. While separation of policy and administration is
more an ideal than a rigidly followed rule, support for that form of government
demonstrates a level of commitment to having professionals in public management roles.
The final piece of the puzzle of administrator cooperation is found in considering
again what interview subjects said on this topic. As was noted in the previous chapter,
there was universal support for ideal of cooperation. But how does this arise?
The answer to this question might come from O’Leary, Gerard, and Bingham
(2006) who justify a symposium on the topic of collaborative public management by
answering the question, “Haven’t public administrators always collaborated?” That the
implied response is in the affirmative offers an important insight into the expectations of
these administrators.
Economic development actors utilize networks of professional colleagues because
collaborating in information sharing is an expected part of the work that they do. They
have lunch with local administrators performing similar work because that is how
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relationships essential to performing the job are sustained. They strengthen these
relationships through their memberships in the same service clubs.
There is at best a subtle distinction between cooperation and collaboration. The
former implies a willingness to work together that might be absent in the latter. These
terms have been interchanged throughout this paper without regard to this distinction. It
is important to note, however, that the research does not indicate whether people work
together willingly or because it is required of them in order to accomplish the work that
they do. It might depend on the individual administrator. In any case, collaboration seems
the more fitting term if for no other reason than it brings to mind the image of multiple
authors contributing to a literary work. The comments indicate that that is how economic
development actors see their work.
How they accomplish this work across organizational boundaries in the absence
of network structures (Mandell, 1999b) or similar real-world entities (Agranoff, 2006)
deserves more consideration. The comparison was made above to peer production
networks used to develop open source software. While there might be similarities that are
worth exploring, there is one important difference: Participants in peer production
networks contribute their work voluntarily; the same cannot be said for certain of all
economic development actors.
It can be said, however, that these actors collaborate to accomplish economic
development activities. Beyond the professional ethos that supports such collaboration,
how do they know to do that? The communities within which these actors perform their
duties provide the authority for this through the political process by which economic
development organizations coordinate their work.
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Peters (1998a) suggests several factors contributing to coordination challenges for
government. These include government involvement in the economy, fiscal problems,
alternative governance models, and decentralization of government functions. As the
focus shifts from government to governance, and networks, whether interorganizational
or interpersonal, arise, the coordination challenge becomes even more important. Peters
offers a conjecture regarding the nature of coordination problems: “Co-ordination may
fail when two organizations perform the same task (redundancy), when no organization
performs a necessary task (lacunae), and when policies with the same clients (including
the entire society as the clients) have different goals and requirements (incoherence)” (p.
303). Community leaders have a clear interest in insuring that this failure is avoided and
that coordination problems, if they occur, are addressed. Chisolm (1989) states the
following:
The coordinative capacity of informal systems can be enhanced by an
organization that plays the role of facilitator in situations where asymmetries of
costs and benefits render coordination improbable among formally independent
organizations. . . . Such a hybrid system compensates for the weakness of
informalities without exhibiting the pathologies of formal, centralized systems of
coordination. (p. 192)
It appears that communities might well achieve this hybridization not through the
facilitative role of a single organization but through a process in which the community’s
leadership legitimizes social networks and corrects problems of redundancy, lacunae, and
incoherence.
It was stated earlier that all of the study communities within the last seven years
went though a process of reorganizing the manner in which they accomplish economic
development by combining existing operations, merging two organizations or joining an
alliance. In some cases, these actions were accomplished through direct political action.
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This was the case when the county in which Riverton is located voted to join a multicounty economic development organization. Centralia provides a different example in
which a private, nonprofit organization was formed to accomplish economic development
without governmental involvement. Acquiescence on the part of elected officials and
their subsequent acceptance of this organization provided the necessary signal to
administrators to collaborate with them on economic development projects.
In light of the function that this coordinating process appears to play in sending
signals to administrators, and which, in fact, might constitute the focal effect that brings
about collaboration, it is instructive to consider the situation in Premiere. The major
players in economic development are city organizations: the economic development
corporation and the downtown development authority. An evenly divided council
provides mixed signals about support for the efforts of these groups, however, as was
noted in every interview I conducted there. While support was shown for downtown
development through the recent hiring of a DDA director, the financing of a major
project in the downtown was forced to referendum through the efforts of a member of the
city council, and it remained an issue into the next council election. Perhaps in an effort
to provide the necessary organizing authority for their collaborative efforts, a task force
has been formed with representatives from various community organizations. In addition,
others are involved in promoting the enterprise facilitation ideas of Ernesto Sirolli.
Political culture does play a role, then, in economic development collaboration,
even if it did not show up in direct response to interview questions. It is communicated
through the policy reflected in the actions of the community to organize itself for that
task. Economic development infrastructure is, in effect, an artifact of the political culture
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of the community. It is a part of the taken-for-granted-ness of the political culture within
which economic development actors work.
Its significance is reinforced as well through the political process. The chamber of
commerce executive for the Lakeside area noted that those who show a reluctance to
cooperate to accomplish economic goals are voted from office or fired. Such actions send
a message to those who remain about community expectations as to what the community
intends to accomplish.
In the end, then, it seems that the process of coordinating community resources
for economic development and the ethic of collaboration held by public administrators
operate within political and organizational cultures that provide an opportunity for
informally organized actors to accomplish the task of building better communities
together. It is clear that this work does not fit within conventional hierarchical
organizations but neither does it require a formal network structure. It appears that an
analysis of the social networks of economic development actors might tell more about
what influences the manner in which they accomplish this work than the diagram of a
decision-making model.
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Game Theory Glossary
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Action—A plan in a Bayesian game in which moves reflect possible
contingencies.
Bayesian game—A way of modeling a game of incomplete information.
Bayes’s rule—A formula for updating the probability of an occurrence based on
information that is received; conditional probability.
Cooperative game—A game in which binding agreements, bargaining, and the
formation of coalitions are possible.
Common knowledge—a fact that is known to all players such that every player
knows that every other player knows it and so forth.
Equilibrium—a strategic situation in a game such that no player can improve his
or her payoff through unilateral action.
Focal-point effect—In a game with multiple equilibria, the tendency for
phenomena external to the game to cause players to choose one equilibrium to the
exclusion of others.
Game—A situation in which two or more individuals make decisions that affect
one another’s welfare; strategic situation.
Game theory—“[T]he study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation
between intelligent rational decision-makers” (Myerson, 1991, p.1).
Imperfect information—A situation in a repeated game in which a player is
uncertain as to the actions taken by other players up to that point, requiring the
calculation of probabilities according to Bayes’s rule.
Incomplete information—A situation in which one or more players in a game has
information not available to other players.
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Noncooperative game—A game in which binding agreements are not possible,
requiring a player to make assumptions about, or calculate the probability of, moves of
other players.
Payoff—The utility to a player resulting from the play of a game.
Private information—Information that is not common knowledge.
Repeated game—A game that occurs in an infinite sequence of rounds during
each one of which players receive information and make decisions.
Strategy—A rule for deciding a move in a game based on information available to
the player. Compare to “Action.”
Type—A way of characterizing a player as a function of the private information
that he or she possesses at the start of a game.
Zero-sum game—A game in which an increase in the payoff to a player results in
a corresponding decrease in the payoff to one or more other players.
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Appendix B
Census Bureau Definitions
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Excerpt, Standards for Defining Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas;
Notice (2000)
“Section 5. Identification of Principal Cities
The Principal City (or Cities) of a CBSA [Core Based Statistical Area] will
include:
(a) the largest incorporated place with a Census 2000 population of at least
10,000 in the CBSA or, if no incorporated place of at least 10,000 population
is present in the CBSA, the largest incorporated place or census designated
place in the CBSA; and
(b) any additional incorporated place or census designated place with a Census
2000 population of at least 250,000 or in which 100,000 or more persons
work; and
(c) any additional incorporated place or census designated place with a Census
2000 population of at least 50,000, but less than 250,000, and in which the
number of jobs meets or exceeds the number of employed residents; and
(d) any additional incorporated place or census designated place with a Census
2000 population of at least 10,000 but less than 50,000, and one-third the
population size of the largest place, and in which the number of jobs meets or
exceeds the number of employed residents.…
(e) “Section 12. Definitions of Key Terms
Census designated place.—A statistical geographic entity that is equivalent to an
incorporated place, defined for the decennial census consisting of a locally recognized,
unincorporated concentration of population that is identified by name.
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Central county.—The county or counties of a Core Based Statistical Area
containing a substantial portion of an urbanized area or urban cluster or both, and to and
from which commuting is measured to determine qualification of outlying counties.…
Core.—A densely settled concentration of population, comprising either an
urbanized area (of 50,000 or more population) or an urban cluster (of 10,000 to 49,999
population) defined by the Census Bureau, around which a Core Based Statistical Area is
defined.
Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA).—A statistical geographic entity consisting
of the county or counties associated with at least one core (urbanized area or urban
cluster) of at least 10,000 population, plus adjacent counties having a high degree of
social and economic integration with the core as measured through commuting ties with
the counties containing the core. Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas are the
two categories of Core Base Statistical Areas. . . .
Metropolitan Statistical Area.—A Core Based Statistical Area associated with at
least one urbanized area that has a population of at least 50,000. The Metropolitan
Statistical Area comprises the central county or counties containing the core, plus
adjacent outlying counties having a high degree of social and economic integration with
the central county as measured through commuting.
Micropolitan Statistical Area.—A Core Based Statistical Area associated with at
least one urban cluster that has a population of at least 10,000, but less than 50,000. The
Micropolitan Statistical Area comprises the central county or counties containing the
core, plus adjacent outlying counties having a high degree of social and economic
integration with the central county as measured through commuting. . . .
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Principal City.—The largest city of a Core Based Statistical Area, plus additional
cities that meet specified statistical criteria. . . .
Urban Area.—The generic term used by the Census Bureau to refer collectively
to urbanized areas and urban clusters.
Urban cluster.—A statistical geographic entity to be defined by the Census
Bureau for Census 2000 consisting of a central place(s) and adjacent densely settled
territory that together contain at least 2,500 people, generally with an overall population
density of at least 2,000 people per square mile. For purposes of defining Core Based
Statistical Areas, only those urban clusters of 10,000 more [sic] population are
considered.
Urbanized area.—A statistical geographic entity defined by the Census Bureau,
consisting of a central place(s) and adjacent densely settled territory that together contain
at least 50,000 people, generally with an overall population density of at least 1,000
people per square mile.” (pp. 82236-82238)
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Interview Protocol—Key Informant
Date of interview:
Time:
Community Identifier:
Interviewee Identifier:
Position of interviewee:
Review confidentiality statement and consent form.
Briefly describe the purpose of the interview.
Questions:
1. Please describe your background, experience and familiarity with the community.
2. Please give a general overview of economic development activities in this
community.
3. What are the principal organizations involved in economic development in this
area?
4. What is the principal focus of economic development efforts?
5. What economic development programs, tools and activities are used here?
6. What are some local examples of economic development success? Failure?
7. Why were these efforts successful? Why did they fail?
8. What are the beliefs, values and expectations that characterize economic
development activities in the community?
9. Is economic development conducted in a cooperative or a competitive manner in
this community? What are some examples?
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10. What recent events or circumstances have most influenced economic
development activities?
Concluding comments.
Thank the interviewee.
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Appendix D
Interview Protocol – Participant Actor
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Interview Protocol—Participant Actor
Date of interview:
Time:
Community Identifier:
Interviewee Identifier:
Position of interviewee:
Review confidentiality statement and consent form.
Briefly describe the purpose of the interview.
Questions:
1. Please describe your background and experience focusing in particular on your
economic development training and experience.
2. Please give a general overview of economic development activities in your
community. How is the community organized for economic development?
3. What are the beliefs, values and expectations that characterize economic
development activities in the community? In your organization? In your
profession?
4. Why is economic development important for this community? For your
organization? For you personally?
5. What are the other primary organizations involved in local economic
development?
6. Who are the other people with whom you interact in economic development
efforts?
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7. How is your approach to economic development similar to the approach of these
other individuals? How does it differ?
8. What do you think the community expects of you with regard to economic
development? How are those expectations communicated?
9. In what ways does your organization influence your approach to economic
development?
10. What does your supervisor/board/council expect of you with regard to economic
development? How are those expectations communicated?
11. Do you belong to professional organizations? Which ones? How do these
organizations and your professional colleagues influence your approach to
economic development?
12. Please describe one recent economic development success story. Why do you
consider this a success?
13. Please describe one recent economic development failure. Why was this a failure?
14. How have these successes and failures affected economic development activities?
15. What recent events or circumstances have most influenced economic
development activities in this community? What has been their effect?
16. Would you describe the relationship among those involved in economic
development in this community as cooperative or competitive? What are some
examples of cooperation? Competition?
17. What makes for successful economic development collaboration? Can you
provide some examples?
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18. Can you provide some examples of an economic development collaboration
failure? Why was this a failure?
19. How do you know when you have done a good job in economic development
activities? What are some examples?
20. Is there a local official or community leader not currently involved in economic
development who might be able to provide additional background information
about economic development activities in this community over the past decade?
What is his or her position?
Concluding comments.
Thank the interviewee.
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The Human Subjects Institutional Review Board (HSIRB) approval letter is on
file with The Graduate College.

